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The purpose of this study is to examine strategies used in jury instructions to  
combat the mum effect in the context of jury misconduct.  This study was conducted using a 2x3 
experimental design employing three sets of typed jury instructions (e.g. Standard, Punitive, and 
Modified) and two videos of juror deliberations portraying the absence or presence of juror 
misconduct. Participants (N = 222) were randomly assigned into one of six experiment 
conditions in which they read one of three sets of jury instructions and completed measures 
examining constructs of punishment and clarity.  They then watched a video of mock jury 
deliberations containing the absence or presence of jury misconduct and then completed a series 
of measures to examine perceptions of misconduct and reporting.  The study found each of the 
three sets of jury instructions to be equally clear.  The punitive instructions were found to be 
more punishing than either the standard or the modified jury instructions.  However, there were 
no significant differences in reporting perceived misconduct across the three jury instruction 
conditions.  Instead, participants who reported the perception of misconduct also tended to report 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
             
        Introduction 
 
In 2010, a manslaughter case in Florida made headlines when the jury foreman’s Internet 
search caused a mistrial (Barrett, 2010).  The foreperson used his iPhone to look up the definition 
of “prudence” on Encarta and shared his findings aloud during deliberations.  However, it was 
only in the days after the verdict had been rendered that a different juror contacted the defense 
counsel to report the misconduct.  The conviction was subsequently overturned, and the case was 
re-tried (Barrett, 2010). 
 This example of juror misconduct, aided by progressing technology, can take place on 
lunch breaks, in cars, and behind the closed doors of deliberations.  The increased accessibility of 
knowledge heavily contributes to a growing number of juror misconduct charges (Bell, 2010).  
Decades ago, jurors would need to consult tangible texts, visit libraries, or drive to crime scenes 
to access the information they now find with a single click.  While some courts instruct security 
to confiscate electronic devices prior to entry, most do not (Blackman & Brickman, 2011).  
Accustomed to the open flow of information, an empaneled juror has access to background, 
facts, and knowledge not formally entered into evidence.  This prohibited retrieval of 
information is a form of juror misconduct and can result in varying consequences.  
The System 
The adversarial courtroom system relies on the rules of evidence to determine the 
information that may be introduced to the jury (Dann, 1993). In this system, jurors remain 
passive observers.  Facts and evidence are filtered through attorneys and judges to the venire, 
and jurors evaluate the veracity and impact of the presented information (Austin, 1984; Dann, 
1993).  Evidence that has not been legally admitted during trial has not withstood the rigorous 
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process of cross-examination and rebuttal, and therefore, cannot be used as a source of 
information during juror deliberations (Bell, 2010).   
Individually gathered information from outside the auspices of the legal system runs the 
risk of being incomplete, inaccurate, or completely fallacious.  Due to these concerns, jurors are 
strictly prohibited from seeking, gathering, or considering information not presented during trial 
for the full length of their service (Bell, 2010; Jones & Lightner II, 2011).  Failure to comply 
with these jury instructions constitutes juror misconduct and can result in a host of negative 
consequences (Jones & Lightner II, 2011).  “Contaminating a verdict” with the introduction of 
outside sources can result in a mistrial and force the process to begin again anew (Bell, 2010, p. 
82).   
Juror misconduct and judicial consequences.  Juror misconduct is a historically 
understudied area of the law (Hoffmeister, 2011).  Most reports of misconduct are anecdotal, and 
little academic research focuses on the topic (Hoffmeister, 2011).  However, while there is an 
absence of empirical data validating an increase in misconduct charges, Bell’s (2010) Westlaw 
search of all cases associated with the term “juror misconduct” suggests a growing trend.  The 
search returned “2701 results for years 1980-1990, 3990 results for years 1990-2000, and 8755 
results for the years 2000-2010” (Bell, 2010, p. 83). A 2010 report by Reuters Legal found that 
since 1999, at least 90 verdicts have been challenged due to allegations of juror misconduct 
centering on prohibited Internet searches (Grow, 2010).  Despite a small sample, Hoffmeister 
(2011) found that 10% of the jurors he surveyed reported personal knowledge of a fellow juror 
conducting Internet research.  Juror misconduct is not an emergent issue, but the evolution of the 
technological medium has increased its efficiency (McGee, 2009). 
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For example, after seven weeks of trial and two years of information gathering, a large 
Federal drug case in Florida ended in a mistrial after eight of the twelve jurors admitted to 
conducting Internet research (Funcheon, 2009).  While a juror initially reported the alleged 
misconduct of a fellow juror to the presiding justice, the other seven jurors did not admit 
misconduct until the judge specifically questioned them (Funcheon, 2009).  In Indiana, a juror 
was dismissed after he researched the reliability of blood alcohol testing and shared his Google 
findings with the rest of the jury (McQuald, 2013).  Recently, an empaneled juror in Orlando was 
dismissed after he searched for further information regarding the defendant, “the Hello Kitty 
Rapist” (Cherney, 2015).  This ability to quickly and easily access information has led to what 
The New York Times writer, John Schwartz (2009), termed the “Google Mistrial.” 
Technology at our fingertips has increased access to information and eased the process of 
its retrieval.  It has become almost instinctual to research information that piques curiosity or 
requires further understanding (Brickman, Blackman, Futterman, & Dinnerstein, 2008). 
Practicing legal consultant, Douglas Keene, contends that some jurors believe they cannot fully 
serve their role in administering justice if they are unable to find the answers to certain questions 
(Schwartz, 2009).  Termed “conscientious jurors,” these individuals believe that actively 
reducing their uncertainty by finding answers is part of performing their role well (Hoffmeister, 
2011, p. 419).  If these “conscientious jurors” exist, as evidence suggests, then it is likely that at 
least a percentage of juror misconduct cases go unnoticed by courts.   
Discovering extra-legal juror investigations is predominately left to self-disclosure or 
reports from fellow jurors.  Hofffmeister (2011) contends, “jurors, not surprisingly, are reluctant 
to report that they have violated the courts rules” making misconduct difficult to detect (p. 983).  
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Only empaneled jurors are allowed into the deliberation room, and they are responsible for 
policing themselves and each other (Sunwolf & Seibold, 1998).  
Allegations of misconduct may lead to consequences such as: sanctions, fines, removal, 
charges of contempt, or ultimately a mistrial (Jones & Lightner II, 2011).  Much like corporate 
whistleblowing, a juror must “disclose illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices … to persons or 
organizations who may be able to effect action” (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 6).  A juror must be 
willing to stray from the group to appeal to an outside authority that has the influence to enact 
change.  This action places the juror at a crossroad between allegiance to the group and the rules 
of the legal system he or she represents (Sunwolf & Seibold, 1998).  This stress is further 
complicated by the hierarchal context and the overwhelming disparity of power.   
The judge in the courtroom serves as the arbitrator of facts, evidence, and 
communication.  While objections are noted on the trial record, he or she makes the ultimate 
decision as to what evidence can be admitted during trial.  The judge controls the flow of 
communication by determining when court begins in the morning and ends in the afternoon, and 
when witnesses can be called.  Some judges have been known to set strict time limits for the 
length of an attorney’s opening and closing remarks (Cresswell, 2006).  The hierarchal power 
wielded by the judge is overt, and also represented nonverbally. 
The judge sits at the bench elevated above the rest of the courtroom and looking down on 
those who approach.  He or she is dressed in a ceremonial black robe, and all those in court must 
stand during a judge’s entrance and exit.  A juror must ultimately be willing to stand before a 
judge, the ultimate authority in the room, and implicate fellow jurors in misconduct.  Not only is 
this confrontation a serious threat to face, but it also requires the speaker to deliver damaging 
news with potentially severe consequences.   
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Theoretical Framework 
The mum effect is defined by Rosen and Tesser (1970) as “keeping mum about 
undesirable messages” (p. 254). This substantiated aversion to delivering undesirable news has 
been observed in a variety of settings (Bisel, Kelley, Ploeger, & Messersmith, 2011; Rosen & 
Tesser, 1970; Rosen & Tesser, 1972). It is not surprising that when confronted with the choice 
whether to communicate negative information to others, individuals usually choose to remain 
silent rather than share the information.  First used to explain the phenomenon occurring in 
dyadic relationships, the presence of the mum effect has since been documented in a variety of 
contexts (Rosen & Tesser, 1970).   The mum effect has been studied in interpersonal, small 
group, and organizational disciplines, and its influences on the dissemination of potentially 
negative information (Bisel, et al., 2011; Kivlighan & Luiza, 2005; Milliken, Morrison, & 
Hewlin, 2003; Ploeger, Kelley, & Bisel, 2011; Rosen & Tesser, 1970). 
While the occurrence of the mum effect and its influence on organizational ethics has 
been studied amidst corporations (Bisel et al., 2011), its presence and implications have not been 
examined in a courtroom context.  Legal scholars (i.e. Aglialoro, 2014; Brickman et al., 2008; 
Hoffmeister, 2011/2015; Jones & Lightner II, 2011) published multiple articles highlighting their 
growing concerns regarding instances of juror misconduct in a digital age.  While each of these 
authors outlines the problem, implications, and recommendations for combatting Internet 
searches, and the dissemination of extralegal information, the problems associated with getting 
jurors to report remain unaddressed.  The growing number of anecdotal examples, and the trends 
reported by Bell (2010), indicate that juror misconduct of this nature continues to occur despite 
current jury instructions and increasing punitive consequences.  It is my contention that 
combatting the mum effect associated with reporting juror misconduct should be just as 
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important as combatting the misconduct itself.  As this study examined the use of jury 
instructions to increase reports of juror misconduct, the mum effect was a relevant theoretical 
framework to apply. 
Purpose/Rationale 
Despite the admonitions in jury instruction which provide behavioral guidelines and 
boundaries for empaneled jurors, instances of juror misconduct continue and are seemingly 
increasing (Bell, 2010).  However, the reporting of these instances is predominately left to self-
disclosure or reports from fellow jurors.  Juror misconduct is not being reported due to the 
reliance on the jurors to report undesirable information.  Currently, jury instructions warn jurors 
not to engage in extralegal activities, but they do not combat the presence of the mum effect or 
actively seek to compel jurors to report. Therefore, it is likely that instances of juror misconduct 
go unchecked.  This failure to combat the mum effect should be addressed in order to further 
protect the rigor of the system. 
Learning more about potential strategies to combat the mum effect in the context of jury 
misconduct could provide judges, lawyers, consultants, and scholars insight into the worth of 
allocating resources to construct and shape jury instructions and communication. Increased 
understanding of the mum effect in the context of jury deliberations has the potential to 
strengthen the theory by providing additional breadth and depth of application.   
Summary 
 In summary, while the mum effect has been studied in a variety of settings in the field of 
communication, currently no research explores its relevance in the small group context of juror 
deliberations.  Over the past decade, legal scholars have highlighted growing concerns regarding 
juror misconduct in an age of Internet and have proposed changes to policies, instructions, and 
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protocols to curb the behavior (e.g. Aglialoro, 2014; Hoffmeister, 2011/2015; Shilo, 2014).  
However, strategies to encourage the reporting of misconduct when it occurs have been ignored.  
As technological capabilities continue to increase, and the amount of information that can be 
accessed online continues to grow, the juror misconduct associated with extralegal information 
gathering requires further study.  Using the mum effect as a framework, further analysis should 
be conducted by communication scholars and applied to this nuanced field of law. 
Chapter Two provides a review of the relevant literature on the influence of facework and 
team face, the implications of the mum effect, and the role of jury instructions.   
Chapter Three describes the experimental methodology and analytical methods 
employed.  
Chapter Four presents the research results and data analyses. 
Chapter Five discusses the research results, the conclusions that may be drawn from the 
experiment, possible limitations of the study, and directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
                  Literature Review 
 
First, I provide an overview of facework and team face to explain the pressures inherent 
in deliberating groups that fuel the presence of the mum effect.  Next, I outline the presence of 
the mum effect in extant research to further develop the rationale for the theory’s inclusion as a 
framework for analysis in the present study. Lastly, I explore role of jury instructions and the 
efficacy of their current limiting power. 
Facework 
 The legal context of juror deliberations, specific deliberative small groups, complicates 
communication. Jurors in the midst of deliberations are called upon to render judgments on 
complex issues and award damages in cases where they might have little experience or 
knowledge (Greene & Bornstein, 2000).  The dynamics of deliberative groups are further 
complicated by the constant need to negotiate public face among individuals who barely know 
each other (Ryfe, 2007).   
Goffman (1959) describes face as an individual’s public self-image.  The desire to 
maintain this face and its positive appeal to others is a universal trait (Brown & Levinson, 1987).  
Not only do people wish to have themselves held in esteem, but they also work to aid others in 
the preservation of face. According to Brown and Levinson’s (1987) assessment, facework is 
both self-directed and other-directed.  This construct is further explicated by the addition of 
positive and negative face (Brown & Levinson, 1987).  Positive face focuses on maintaining and 
displaying a positive self-image, and it speaks to the desire to be liked or held in high regard by 
others.  Negative face refers to the wish to be autonomous and remain unimpeded by others 
(Brown & Levinson, 1987).  Individuals strive to protect and maintain both positive and negative 
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face, and as a result, it is not preferential to engage in face-threatening actions.  The cultural 
emphasis placed on face often means that great pains are taken to protect oneself and others from 
its diminishment (Bisel, Messersmith, & Kelley, 2012).  Potential threats are often countered 
with facework, which attempts to mitigate or ameliorate the impact of the face-threatening action 
(Brown & Levinson, 1987).  Deliberating members must continuously work to negotiate threats 
to their positive and negative face (Ryfe, 2007).   
Constraints placed on jurors’ autonomy such as: actions, behaviors, and considerations 
are obstacles to negative face.  While jurors do have the power to decide a verdict, they must 
work within the strict confines of a judge’s instructions.  They may not conduct research or refer 
to inadmissible evidence.  Therefore, their freedom of information is checked.  Failure to adhere 
to these requirements may result in removal, fines, or mistrial (Jones & Lightner II, 2011).  Each 
of these consequences impairs the positive face by reducing esteem. Should a juror engage in 
misconduct, he or she must either self-report or be reported by their deliberating colleagues.  
Misconduct allegations brought against a juror threatens the positive face of all parties involved.  
Confessing exposes the transgressor as lacking propriety, the reporter as a whistle-blower, and 
the judge as lacking control.  Reporting misconduct is an attack against face and acts in direct 
opposition to the self-directed and other-directed facework that serves as a cultural norm. 
Team face.  The role of team face refers to the importance of protecting the collective 
face of the group.  Failure by a single party to appropriately follow the collective places the face 
of the team at risk.  As Goffman (1959) explains, each participant plays an important role in the 
success of the collective.  An individual’s poor performance is then reflected as the group’s poor 
performance.  In this context, a team is defined as “a set of performers who cooperate in 
presenting a single performance” (Goffman, 1959, p. 50). 
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Deliberating jurors effectively fall under the definition of a team- working together 
through the singular performance of arriving at a verdict.  In this context, the failure of one of the 
team members to follow the directives provided in the jury instructions would result not only in a 
threat to face for the offending juror, but a threat to the team face should the misconduct be 
discovered.  As a means of protecting the team face, members of the collective may be less 
inclined to report instances of perceived failings.  Goffman’s (1959) notion of team face works to 
unpack the inherent motivations which may enhance the mum effect. 
The Mum Effect  
The mum effect was first used as lens through which to view interpersonal 
communication.  Participants in a series of studies were found to be more likely to pass along 
positive information, and often failed in their duties to fully communicate negative information 
(Rosen & Tesser, 1970; Rosen, Tesser, & Batchelor, 1972).   
Rosen and Tesser (1970) first hypothesized that the reluctance to communicate 
information was directly dependent on whether receiving the message would be desirable for the 
recipient.  The researchers constructed a consumer testing scenario in which participants 
believed they were there to rate deodorants.  During the fake consumer testing, a researcher told 
the participant that they were expecting another person shortly, and could he please tell the 
arriving participant (played by a confederate) that “Glenn Lester should be told to call home as 
soon as he comes in.  Apparently there is some very good (bad) news about his family that he has 
got to get right away.”  Two minutes later, the confederate entered the room and introduced 
himself as Glenn Lester.  Researchers then noted if the participant immediately conveyed the 
message, waited to convey the message until after gentle prodding by the confederate, or never 
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conveyed the message at all.  A post-experiment survey was then conducted to ascertain to what 
degree participants wanted to convey the message. 
Rosen and Tesser (1970) concluded that the likelihood that a message will be transferred 
is directly dependent on whether it is perceived to be pleasant news for the receiver.  In instances 
where the message was negative, the participant might have told the confederate about the call, 
but did not express the directionality of the news.  They also found that if the message was 
considered by the participants to be urgent, it was more probable that it would be transmitted. 
Rosen, Tesser, and Batchelor (1972) extended the first study of the mum effect by 
examining some confounding variables. They posited that bestowing a responsibility to transmit 
the information should lead to a reduction in the mum effect.  They also questioned whether the 
directionality of the news affected the expressed desire to communicate and whether desire to 
communicate is associated with the mum effect. Using role playing, Rosen et al. (1972) 
presented 24 variations of a scenario to test reporting. Through explicit instruction, participants 
who were given direct responsibility to pass on information were more likely to do so during the 
first opportunity for interaction (Rosen et al., 1972).  However, the effects of responsibility were 
substantially reduced during the second opportunity for interaction (Rosen et al., 1972).  The 
intensity of the obligation was still not enough to bring about the complete transmission of 
negative information to a stranger (Rosen et al., 1972).  Instead, the directionality of negative 
messages was often omitted by the participant to render the information innocuous (Rosen & 
Tesser, 1970; Rosen et al., 1972).  
This reluctance to share unsavory information with others extends across disciplines and 
contexts. Smith, Keil, and Depledge (2001) used the mum effect in an organizational context to 
explain the reluctance of employees to report when an internal project was falling apart.  The 
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authors found that participants assuming the role of managers were more likely to report 
runaway projects when they believed that they had an explicit individual responsibility to do so.  
Participants were also found to be less likely to report bad news when they felt it would place 
them at personal risk of negative consequences.   
These organizational behaviors may also be applicable in a courtroom context.  Instances 
of jury misconduct may have similar implications to a runaway project or a project perceived to 
be going under.  The possibility of a mistrial related to misconduct could mean that the case 
would have to be tried again in front of a new jury at additional cost (Jones & Lightner II, 2011).  
The first trial could be conceived of as a failure, or a project gone under.   
Jones and Lightner II (2011) contend that jury instructions should remind jurors that 
instances of misconduct will likely result in a mistrial and should be framed in terms of the 
financial toll this exacts. Mistrials result in wasted court costs (e.g. taxpayer money), litigating 
party’s expenses (e.g. preparation, lodging, travel, paid experts, trial technology), and wasted 
sacrifices of those trying to fulfill their civic duty (e.g. loss of work time, extra childcare, etc.) 
(Jones & Lightner II, 2011).  It is also possible that jurors would be less likely to report 
misconduct if they believe they would be at personal risk of negative consequences.  Therefore, 
punitive concerns of fines, removal, or being held in contempt may keep jurors from coming 
forward. 
Similar to bystander intervention research, Smith, Keil, and Depledge (2001) posit that as 
the number of individuals who know a project is going bad increases, specific individuals feel 
less personal responsibility to report its negative status.  While the authors did not test this 
hypothesis directly, they called for it to be explored in future research.  Similarly, a juror 
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empaneled with five to twelve other jurors may feel less responsibility to report misconduct if 
other jurors are also aware that it was committed.   
The hierarchal mum effect.  Frequently studied in an organizational context, the mum 
effect is found to be particularly salient in impeding the upward movement of perceived 
undesirable news from a subordinate to a supervisor (Bisel et al. 2012; Milliken et al. 2003; 
Ploeger et al., 2011).  After interviewing 40 employees from a variety of industries, Milliken et 
al. (2003) found that the majority were uncomfortable voicing concerns and chose not to raise 
issues thought to be important to their supervisors.  The study further explicated the employee’s 
reasons for silence, and found that they feared being labeled negatively, adversely impacting 
their relationships, and creating an overall perception of futility.  These face saving measures 
compelled employee silence on a variety of issues including: the incompetence of a boss, 
suggestions for organizational improvement, and pay equity (Milliken et al., 2003).   
We can draw comparisons between the mum effect employed when reporting to a 
supervisor and the same hierarchal disparity inherent when reporting juror misconduct to a 
presiding judge or courtroom bailiff.  Fear of censure, causing disappointment, or being 
perceived negatively in front of the court may preclude jurors from coming forward.  The power 
differential makes it difficult for a juror even to gain access to the judge to report any 
misconduct.  A juror must first approach a bailiff or member of the court and ask to be heard.  
These levels of interaction contain multiple possible threats to face and may be avoided by jurors 
altogether.  Therefore, strategies to ameliorate this threat and encourage reporting are also 
relevant in a courtroom context and warrant further study. 
Bisel et al. (2012) described this reluctance to communicate undesirable information 
upward as hierarchal mum effect.  They contend that the restriction placed on the flow of 
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information can be attributed to the command structures in place.  The authors hypothesized that 
a supervisor’s public image is placed at greater risk when negative feedback originates from a 
subordinate.  Therefore, to avoid such threats to public face, the subordinate remains silent or 
employs equivocation to reconfigure the message into a version less threatening (Bisel et al., 
2012).  This tactic of equivocation is commonly used when relaying the truth could be “against 
one’s own self-interest” (Bavelas, Black, Chovil, & Mullett, 1990, p. 60).  The equivocation of 
messages aids in the preservation of face by drawing attention to some truths rather than others 
and is similar to the innocuous messages delivered by participants in interpersonal studies (Bisel 
et al., 2012; Rosen & Tesser, 1970; Rosen et al., 1972).   
Subordinates who were asked to respond to an employer’s unethical requests also 
employed equivocation.  Ploeger and colleagues (2011) tested the hierarchal mum effect in an 
investigation of organizational ethics.  Participants responded to an unethical request 
hypothetically brought to them by a subordinate, supervisor, or colleague.  The results confirmed 
the hierarchal mum effect wherein subordinates were less likely to directly call attention to the 
ethical violation inherent in the request.  Instead, relying on the use of equivocation, most 
subordinates sought to indirectly deny their superior’s appeal.  The researchers also concluded 
that females, younger workers, and those with the least amount of work experience were most 
likely to employ indirect measures (Ploeger et al., 2011).  Equivocation and silence are the 
predominate responses to important topics in the work place, especially concerning ethical 
matters (Bisel et al., 2012).   
The moral mum effect.  Bisel and Kramer (2013) extended the mum effect further to 
explain an individual’s reluctance outwardly to term a person’s behavior as unethical or immoral.  
The moral mum effect asserts that individuals shy away from outwardly announcing or drawing 
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attention to others’ questionable morals due to the face threat for both parties involved.  Bisel 
and Kramer (2013) examined the justifications workers use when publically denying what they 
privately believe to be unethical requests in the workplace.   
The authors crafted a scenario in which participants were asked to imagine themselves as 
the office manager and respond to a request from either a co-worker, subordinate, or supervisor 
to write a check from company funds to reimburse the cost of his own personal luncheon. The 
rhetorical phrasing of request denials almost never directly mentioned the unethicality implicit in 
the request (Bisel & Kramer, 2013).  Instead, the denial was most frequently couched in 
language that scapegoated policy as the cause for rejection.   
Bisel and Kramer (2013) concluded that charging a request as unethical presents too great 
a threat to face, and therefore must be veiled in policy or operational justifications in order to 
depersonalize the interaction.  Situated in the context of organizational communication, the 
authors contended that insight into workers’ discursive practices has the potential to improve the 
development of an organization’s policies, codes of conduct, and training initiatives (Bisel & 
Kramer, 2013).  This provides a rationale for why individuals would choose to remain silent or 
equivocate when exposed to an unethical request.  It also provides a foundation to understand 
why participants might choose to never explicitly label or draw attention to unethicality.   
Bisel and Kramer (2013) recommended that organizational leaders should acknowledge 
the reliance on policy and “craft policies to provide workers this discursive resource” (p. 14).  
The authors recommended that leaders highlight unethical behavior and use case studies to label 
examples specifically as “unethical.”  This purposeful labeling could aid in mitigating the moral 
mum effect and policy scapegoating and work to build an organization with clear moral 
standards.   
16 
The moral mum effect may also be applied to a courtroom context.  It may prove difficult 
for a juror publically to name another juror’s actions or speech as misconduct since this labeling 
implies failure to follow instructions, unacceptable or inappropriate behavior, and wrongdoing.  
Instead of engaging in face threatening behavior, jurors may choose to remain silent instead.  
Bisel and Kramer’s (2013) work implies that jurors might also employ forms of equivocation or 
strategic rhetoric to avoid naming the misconduct directly.   
The mum effect in the courtroom.  Currently, only one study seems to illustrate these 
dilemmas in a courtroom context.  Sunwolf and Siebold (1998) employed a structuration 
approach to determine whether jurors invoke a set of informal rules when working through 
communicative challenges. Potential jurors, waiting in a western state courthouse, were asked to 
respond to five different scenarios to ascertain what rules jurors might use for (1) selecting a 
leader, (2) voting procedures, (3) requesting judicial resources, (4) handling member misconduct, 
and (5) resolving decision disagreement.   
In the fourth scenario, potential jurors were presented with an instance of member 
deviance wherein a fellow juror admitted to withholding information during voir dire that might 
have resulted in his or her removal from the jury.  The results indicated that from a sample of 97 
participants, only 21% of the rules conceived resulted in informing the judge of the misconduct.  
Instead, 39% of the rules constructed decided that the jurors should simply disregard the 
information by not listening to it.  Only two percent of the participants indicated that the rest of 
the jury had a duty to report instance of misconduct.  
Sunwolf and Siebold (1998) contended that juror misconduct represents “a threat of 
failure to the group” wherein it is a difficult decision whether to report the allegation and even to 
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whom, or how, it should be reported (p. 290). While the study did not address the mum effect, its 
presence is implied, and the preliminary findings warrant further study.   
Jury Instructions 
 Jury instructions are designed to provide boundaries and guidelines for the behavior of 
deliberating jurors when reaching a verdict.  While jury instructions may cover a wide variety of 
areas including court mandated definitions, the roles of each party, or the standards of proof 
necessary for the case, this study focuses on the admonitions given prior to trial which address 
juror misconduct.  When developing the content for these jury instructions, courts have utilized 
two different rhetorical strategies in an attempt to mitigate misconduct.  However, neither of 
these strategies appears to be overwhelmingly successful given the increasing instances of juror 
misconduct.   
Standard instructions.  Although the language specifically included in jury instructions 
can vary, the content is similar.  The judicial instructions preceding trial typically warn jurors 
that they should not conduct individual fact-finding missions or search for further information on 
the Internet (Diamond & Vidmar, 2001).  For example, The Model Civil Jury Instructions for the 
District Courts of the Third Circuit (2015) warn jurors: 
In addition, do not try to do any independent research or investigation on your own on 
matters relating to the case or this type of case.  Do no do any research on the Internet, 
for example.  You are to decide the case upon the evidence presented at trial.  In other 
words, you should not consult dictionaries or reference materials, search the Internet, 
websites, blogs, or use any other electronic tools to obtain information about this case or 
to help you decide the case.  Please do not try to find out information from any source 
outside the confines of this courtroom. (p. 5) 
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While preliminary instructions typically prohibit jurors from conducting independent 
research, not all instructions indicate whose responsibility it is to report misconduct and how to 
report if it occurs.  The Model Civil Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Third Circuit 
(2015) make no mention of how jurors should report misconduct or to whom. The pattern 
instructions for civil cases held in the Federal Fifth Circuit courts also explain the importance of 
abstaining from extralegal, research but also only briefly touch on reporting: 
Third, do not do any research—on the Internet, in libraries, in books, newspapers, 
magazines, or using any other source or method. Do not make any investigation about 
this case on your own. Do not visit or view any place discussed in this case and do not 
use Internet programs or other devices to search for or view any place discussed in the 
testimony. Do not in any way research any information about this case, the law, or the 
people involved, including the parties, the witnesses, the lawyers, or the judge, until after 
you have been excused as jurors. If you happen to see or hear anything touching on this 
case in the media, turn away and report it to me [the judge] as soon as possible. (2014, p. 
2) 
While the Federal Fifth Circuit provides jurors with a bit more information 
regarding reporting protocol, it contains no specific instruction as to how this reporting should 
take place or compelling rhetoric regarding the duty of the juror to report.  Jurors are left to 
discern the appropriate time and place to approach the judge to report instances of misconduct.  
 Jurors may not understand or believe that it is their personal responsibility to report 
instances of Internet misconduct.  Some jury instructions fail to mention the responsibility to 
report at all (e.g., Federal District Courts of the Third Circuit, 2010).  Failing to attribute 
responsibility lessens the likelihood that the undesirable information will be reported (Rosen et 
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al., 1972).  In these instances, jurors may choose to remain silent instead of engaging in face 
threatening behavior or risking uncertain punitive consequences.   
In some examples of jury instructions, jurors are directly charged to promptly report 
instances of misconduct to the court attendant or bailiff (e.g. The State California Civil Jury 
Instructions, 2015).  While this instruction does place the responsibility of the undesirable 
message’s delivery with each empaneled juror, it does not mean it will be delivered, or that it 
will be delivered in totality.  Extant research also implies that if undesirable information is not 
reported during the first communication opportunity, the effects of responsibility lessen, and the 
undesirable information is less likely to be communicated during the second opportunity (Rosen 
et al., 1972).  If the misconduct is perpetrated or discussed in front of others, the responsibility to 
report may also be shirked or ignored.  
The precise consequence of committing extralegal Internet research is also unclear.  
There is no mandated penalty for the misconduct.  Instead, the judge has the discretion to 
determine the extent of the impact on the trial and take the necessary corrective steps (Jones & 
Lightner II, 2011).  Judges have been known to levy hefty fines, hold jurors in contempt 
resulting in jail time, and dismiss jurors from service (Jones & Lightner II, 2011).  In 2015, a 
New York foreperson was fined $1,000 and held in contempt of court after she committed 
misconduct by posting status updates on Facebook regarding the trial (Matyszcyk, 2015).  A 
juror in Palm Beach County who looked up two words on an online dictionary, and sent 
Facebook messages regarding the trial to a fellow juror, spent eight days in jail as a result 
(Freeman, 2016).  The Federal Fifth Circuit instructions (2014) explain simply that, “failure to 
follow these instructions could result in the case having to be retried” (p. 3).  The Federal Third 
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Circuit Model Instructions (2010) make no mention of potential consequences for juror 
misconduct.   
In conclusion, while the standard instructions define instances of extralegal research 
which are prohibited, they fail to employ several strategies they may enhance the reporting of 
juror misconduct.  Based on extant research, these strategies include: (1) expressly naming and 
defining the extralegal research as “misconduct,” (2) assigning individual responsibility for 
reporting misconduct with each juror, (3) framing the “duty to report” as part of the identity of a 
responsible juror, and (4) outlining a clear reporting protocol.  The standard instructions 
highlight the consequence to the system as opposed to any personal consequences to the juror.  
They also fail to offer the jurors any active procedure for reporting instances of misconduct. 
Punitive instructions.  In 2011, California passed legislation that sought to criminalize 
juror misconduct arising through the use of social media.  Section 166(a)(6) of the California 
Penal Code allows jurors to be charged with a misdemeanor offense should they engage in 
"willful disobedience by a juror of a court admonishment related to the prohibition on any form 
of communication or research about the case, including all forms of electronic or wireless 
communication or research.” This admonishment includes social media posting and is punishable 
by a maximum of six months in jail or a fine of up to $1,000 (Aglialoro, 2014).  Therefore, the 
State California Civil Jury Instructions (2015) warn jurors: 
If you violate any of these prohibitions on communications and research, including 
prohibitions on electronic communications and research, you may be held in contempt of 
court or face other sanctions.  That means you may have to serve time in jail, pay a fine, 
or face other punishment for that violation. (p. 7) 
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These instructions reflect the wide range of potential personal consequences for a juror engaging 
in misconduct. Legal scholars (Aglialoro, 2014; Hoffmeister, 2015) have questioned the adverse 
effect that punishing jurors may have on the legal system citing concerns of jurors’ resistance to 
serving and the inability to adequately investigate misconduct.  In instances where the behavior 
is criminalized, jurors would compromise their fifth amendment right to not be forced to 
incriminate themselves for wrongdoing should they report their misconduct (Aglialoro, 2014). 
The personal consequences reflected in the State California Civil Jury Instructions (2015) might 
also serve as an obstacle to a juror’s willingness to report allegations of misconduct. 
 While the State California Civil Jury Instructions (2015) request, “If you receive any 
information about this case from any source outside of the courtroom, promptly report it to the 
court [attendant/bailiff].  It is important that all jurors see and hear the same evidence at the same 
time” (p. 7).  These instructions could be confusing and may leave jurors questioning whether 
they need to report fellow jurors’ extralegal activity (i.e. online research) if it was shared at the 
same time with all jurors during deliberations.  These instructions do offer the jurors a means of 
active response; however, it remains unclear how the information should be reported to the 
attendant or bailiff. 
Defining the Experimental Conditions 
The content used in pattern jury instructions to illustrate the behavioral boundaries for 
jurors operates in two distinct directions.  The standard instructions inform jurors of the rules 
governing their behavior, while the punitive instructions limit the behavior and provide 
consequences for misconduct.  However, neither of these strategies seems efficient at staving off 
extralegal juror activity.  Jury instructions should be used not only to educate jurors of their 
behavioral restrictions, but to encourage reporting if those restrictions are breached.   
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This lack of success leads me to consider whether other forms of juror instructions which 
consider the mum effect may increase reporting of misconduct.  If jury instructions do not have 
the efficacy to stop misconduct from occurring, they should be designed to encourage juror 
reporting when it occurs.  Therefore, the following experiment examined the effects of new jury 
instructions developed from extant research on the mum effect (Rosen & Tesser, 1970, Rosen et 
al., 1972).  This experiment tested and compared the effects of three types of jury instructions 
(e.g. standard, punitive and modified) on participant reporting of misconduct when misconduct 
was present or absent as a condition. 
Each set of jury instructions focused on limiting the behaviors of the empaneled jurors 
and offer little guidance on how to report instances of misconduct when it does occur.  Three 
variations of pattern jury instructions (i.e., standard, punitive, and modified) were used to test 
strategies meant to encourage juror reporting of misconduct.  These conditions reflected pattern 
jury instructions currently in circulation and offered a third, modified version, based on extant 
research surrounding the mum effect. 
Standard instructions. First, “standard” instructions from the Federal Fifth Circuit Civil 
Courts (2014) were similar in content to those used in most venues across the country.  These 
instructions outlined the rules for empaneled jurors prohibiting them from speaking to others 
about the case, researching the case or case facts, or posting about the case on social media.  
These instructions also framed the consequences of misconduct to the courtroom system while 
overlooking any potential consequences to individual jurors.  They also failed to call for a 
specific active juror response when faced with instances of misconduct.  
Punitive instructions. The “punitive” instructions followed the same standard pattern 
instructions and outlined the rules for empaneled jurors prohibiting them from speaking to others 
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about the case, researching the case or case facts, or posting about the case on social media.  An 
additional portion of the State California Civil Instructions (2015) provided the “punitive” 
condition by outlining the personal consequences to jurors should they engage in misconduct 
while ignoring the consequences to the system.  The punitive portion of the State California Civil 
Instructions (2015) were added to the standard instructions to form the “punitive” condition.    
Modified instructions. The “modified” instructions followed the same standard pattern 
instructions and outlined the rules for empaneled jurors prohibiting them from speaking to others 
about the case, researching the case or case facts, or posting about the case on social media.  
These instructions included strategies which extant research (e.g. Bisel et al., 2011; Bisel & 
Kramer, 2013) reflects may reduce the mum effect. These included: (1) expressly naming and 
defining the extra-legal research as “misconduct,” (2) assigning individual responsibility for 
reporting misconduct with each juror, (3) framing the “duty to report” as part of the identity of a 
responsible juror, and (4) calling for an active juror response by outlining a clear reporting 
protocol.  The modified instructions did not include any punitive consequences for juror 
misconduct or consequences to the system.  Instead, they framed the failure to report juror 
misconduct as putting the rigor of the judicial system at risk. 
These three conditions were varied with an instance or absence of juror misconduct.  In 
one set of conditions, a mock juror admitted to conducting extralegal research (juror misconduct) 
and used the information he or she learned by googling the Plaintiff when speaking with the 






Two potential moderating variables were also included to test participants’ perceptions of 
the jury instruction’s clarity and punishment. 
Clarity.  The definition of clarity is based on the definition of teacher clarity developed 
by Chesebro (1988).  This extrapolation is warranted as the jury instructions work to teach jurors 
the rules and restrictions they must follow for engagement.  In both contexts, the goal of the 
communication is to effectively relate information to a secondary party with the hopes of 
enhancing understanding.  Therefore, in this context, clarity is defined as the process by which 
the instructions are able to effectively stimulate the desired meaning of content and processes in 
the minds of jurors through the use of appropriately-structured messages.  Each set of 
instructions (standard, punitive, and modified) contain the standard instructions as the bulk of the 
content.   
Punishment.  Miller and Vidmar (1981) contend that the definition of punishment has 
long been defined and conceptualized in the social sciences in a variety of confusing ways.  They 
advocate for a straight-forward definition that does not tie the term to complicated technology 
and avoids the complex issue of defining a particular legal act.  Therefore, Miller and Vidmar 
(1981) conceptualize punishment as being a negative sanction intentionally applied to someone 
who is perceived to have violated a law, a rule, a norm, or an expectation.   
The State California Civil Jury Instructions (2015) apply negative sanctions by punishing 
jurors who are caught engaging in juror misconduct.  The “standard” instructions from the 
Federal Fifth Circuit Civil Courts (2014) forgo any mention of sanctions placed on offending 
jurors and instead focus on bounding the rules, norms, and expectations.  As Smith, Keil, and 
Depledge (2001) found, individuals are more likely to abstain from reporting negative 
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information when they believe there to be a risk of consequences.  While reporting the 
misconduct of another juror may not place the reporter at risk of personal sanctions, reporting 
also operates as threat to face (Bisel, Messersmith, & Kelley, 2012). 
Following these conditions, the subsequent research question and hypotheses are proposed: 
RQ1:  Do the experiment conditions (jury instructions) affect participant’s perceptions of clarity?  
H1: The experiment conditions (jury instructions) will significantly affect participant’s 
perceptions of punishment. 
H2:  Participants will perceive that juror misconduct occurred in each of the three jury instruction 
conditions (standard, punitive, modified) when misconduct is present as a condition.   
H3: Jury instructions will have ordered success in enhancing participants’ reporting of 
misconduct.  The modified instructions will be most effective, followed by the standard 




Chapter 3: Method 
 
         Method 
Design 
This study was conducted using a 2x3 experimental design employing three sets of typed 
jury instructions (e.g. Standard, Punitive, and Modified) and two videos of juror deliberations 
portraying the absence or presence of juror misconduct. 
Jury Instructions. Three sets of jury instructions were employed in this study.  
Participants were randomly assigned to a set of jury instructions read by the participant prior to 
viewing jury deliberations.  While pattern jury instructions are lengthy, this study focused only 
on the portion of the instructions containing preliminary admonitions regarding juror 
misconduct.   
The pattern jury instructions for the Federal Fifth Circuit’s civil cases represent 
“standard” instructions similarly used across the country.  The Eastern District of Texas falls 
within the Federal Fifth Circuit and uses these as pattern instructions in a variety of civil cases.  
These would also be read to jurors by the judge prior to the start of trial in patent infringement 
cases with slight changes to wording made at the judge’s discretion.   
Standard instructions. The “standard” instructions framed the boundaries for empaneled 
jurors.  They warned jurors not speak to others about the case, research the case or case facts, or 
post about the case on social media.  These instructions also outlined the consequences of juror 
misconduct to the courtroom system (i.e. potential for mistrial) while ignoring any potential 
consequences to the individual jurors.  They also did not call for specific active juror response 
when confronted with instances of juror misconduct. 
Punitive instructions. The “punitive” instructions followed the standard pattern 
instructions by outlining the same rules and boundaries jurors must follow while empaneled.  A 
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portion of The State California Civil Jury Instructions (2015) was embedded in the standard 
instructions to outline the personal consequences to jurors who engage in misconduct.  The State 
California Civil Jury Instructions (2015) are considered “punitive” in their attempt to address and 
criminalize social media usage, misuse of technology, and extralegal Internet searches (Aligoro, 
2014; Hoffmeister, 2015).  These instructions highlighted the potential individual consequences 
of juror misconduct while ignoring the consequences to the system.  They also failed to provide 
jurors with instructions for active juror reporting. 
Modified instructions. The final set of “modified” jury instructions used the Federal 
Fifth Circuit jury instructions (2014) as a template, and were modified to incorporate additional 
language meant to diminish the mum effect and encourage the reporting of juror misconduct.  
These strategies included: (1) expressly and clearly naming and defining the extra-legal research 
as “misconduct,” (2) assigning individual responsibility for reporting misconduct with each 
juror, (3) framing the “duty to report” as part of the identity of a responsible juror, and (4) calling 
for an active juror response by outlining a clear reporting protocol.  The modified instructions 
did not include any punitive consequences for juror misconduct or consequences to the system.  
Instead, they framed the failure to report juror misconduct as putting the rigor of the judicial 
system at risk.  This set of jury instructions was vetted by a trial attorney in Lawrence, Kansas 
for legal authenticity.  Each of the three sets of jury instructions are printed verbatim in 
Appendix ‘B.’ 
Juror Deliberations. The deliberation transcript, used as a script for the juror videos, 
was the work product of a trial consulting firm, McGee and Associates (a pseudonym).  As a part 
of their services, McGee and Associates perform mock trials at the request of clients to prepare 
for future litigation or to aid in settlement.  The firm is predominately situated in civil torts and 
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spends a large percentage of time aiding in patent litigation.  Employed by one side of the suit, 
the firm constructs a mock trial made up of 24 potential jurors.  These participants reside in the 
Eastern District of Texas where the case will be filed and fulfill the necessary legal requirements 
to be placed on a jury (i.e., age, no felonies, citizen of the United States, etc.).   
The firm utilizes a purposeful sampling technique to fulfill the demographics that 
proportionately reflect those of the district and include a variety of ages, races, sexes, and socio-
economic backgrounds. After witnessing testimony from both sides of the lawsuit, including 
some exhibits, deposition footage, and damage discussions, the 24 jurors are broken into three 
groups and sent into separate rooms to deliberate.  The participants are not told which party 
employed the consulting team, or for what purpose. The deliberation groups are recorded and 
transcribed.   
This resulting transcript was chosen at random from one of the three groups, and 
contained deliberations on a patent infringement case in the Eastern District of Texas.  It was 
then manipulated to contain an instance of juror misconduct.  Minor changes were made to the 
transcript to enhance clarity and grammar.   
The instance of misconduct included a juror explaining that he did not understand the 
technology in the case, and therefore, Googled the company and the patent to gain more 
information.  The juror then went on to inform the other jurors that he also found that the 
Plaintiff is a non-practicing entity (patent troll) and that no money should be awarded to a 
company that does not use its patents to create products. The actor portrayal of this deliberation 
resulted in a 15-minute video. 
The second transcript, with no instance of juror misconduct, maintained its original 
integrity from the McGee transcription.  Other than the instance of juror misconduct (appearing 
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in bold for reference), the scripts were identical.  The scripts were also submitted to a practicing 
trial attorney in Kansas to check for the authenticity of the alleged misconduct.  This version of 
the script resulted in 14 minutes of recorded deliberations (Appendix ‘C’). 
Two videos of juror deliberations were produced.  The eight actors/actresses used to 
record the footage were recruited locally through an ad on the Theatre Lawrence’s social media 
page by the theatre’s artistic director.  The researcher then auditioned the actor/actresses using 
prepared scenes from the transcript to ensure the believability and professionalism of those 
casted. The deliberation including the instance of misconduct was filmed.  The casted actors 
were paid fifty dollars each through an awarded doctoral research student fund for their 
participation and time.  The instance of misconduct was then edited out in post-production by the 
researcher to ensure that the two deliberation videos were otherwise the same.  The pilot study 
confirmed that participants could accurately identify the juror misconduct during deliberations 
and the results are outlined in the following section. 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study was first conducted (N = 164) to establish the validity of the experimental 
methods and confirm successful manipulations.  Pilot study participants were students and adults 
recruited through communication courses and networks at a university in the Midwest. Students 
were offered a minimal amount of extra credit in exchange engaging in the experiment and 
completing an online survey.  A total of 164 adults meeting all the requirements of a prospective 
juror participated in the pilot study.  The sample was 59% female, with an average age of 26 (SD 
= 13.93, range 18-73).  The race or ethnicity of these adults was 79% Caucasian, 6% Black, 5% 
Hispanic, 7% Asian, .6% Native American, and 6% “other.” The highest level of education 
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completed was: 20% high school or GED, 57% some college, 5% a two-year degree, 7% a four-
year degree, and 11% a graduate degree. 
Manipulation checks. To discern whether participants could detect the experimental 
manipulations, three manipulation check questions were used.  Separate Chi Squared analysis 
examined the difference across conditions for each manipulation check question.  The first two 
manipulation check questions were used to assess the jury instruction conditions.   
The first question asked participants to answer “yes” or “no” to the following statement: 
“Do the jury instructions include specific directions and options as to how to go about reporting 
jury misconduct?” and was significant, c2(2)= 22.56, p <.0001.  Further analysis indicated that 
the standard condition was not different from the punitive condition, c2(2)= .610, p = .44.  
However, the punitive condition was different from the modified condition, c2(2)= 8.97, p = 
.003, as was the standard condition and the modified condition, c2(2)= .5.06, p = .02.  Taken 
together, these results indicate that the manipulation was successful.   
Table 1 
Instructions as to how to report misconduct across jury instruction conditions 
   Count/ Percent within jury instructions 
______________________________________________________________________ 
       Instruction to Report Misconduct 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Instructions  Yes   No   Adjusted 
Residual 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Standard  23 (28%)  32 (39%)  -.9  
 
Punitive  18 (22)   37 (45.1)  -1.8  
   
Modified  41 (50)   13 (15.9)  2.7* 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
N   82 (100)  82 (100)    
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. * p <.05 if adjusted residual > 1.96.  Overall Chi square c2(2) = 22.56, p < .0001 
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The second manipulation check question asked participants to indicate whether: 
“According to the jury instructions, are there any personal consequences for a juror who does not 
follow the instructions?” and was significant, c2(2) = 11.99, p = .002.  Further analysis indicated 
that the standard condition was not different from the modified condition, c2(2)= .446, p = .50.  
However, the punitive condition was different from the standard condition, c2(2)= 11.03, p = 
.001, as was the punitive condition and the modified condition, c2(2)= 7.13, p = .008.  Taken 
together, these results indicate that the manipulation was successful.        
Table 2 
Personal consequences for an offending juror across jury instruction conditions 
   Count/ Percent within jury instructions 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
      Personal Consequences 
_____________________________________________________________________ 




Standard  25 (26.3%)  30 (43.5%)  -2.3 
 
Punitive  42 (44.2)  13 (18.8)  3.4* 
   
Modified  28 (29.5)   26 (37.7)  1.1 
______________________________________________________________________ 
N   95 (100)  69 (100)    
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note. * p <.05 if adjusted residual > 1.96.  Overall Chi square c2(2) = 11.99, p = .002 
The final manipulation check question was used to assess the video conditions.  This 
question asked participants to indicate whether “During deliberations, a member of the jury 





Google search occurring across jury instruction and video conditions 
       Count/ Percent within misconduct 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
               Google Search 
___________________________________________________________________________ 




Misconduct  Standard  27 (71.1%)  3 (18.8%) 3.5* 
 
   Punitive  25 (71.4)  3 (15)  4.0*  
  
   Modified  21 (61.8)  3 (15)  3.3* 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
N      73 (100)  9 (100)  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
No Misconduct Standard  11 (28.9)  13 (81.3) -3.5 
 
   Punitive  10 (28.6)  17 (85)  -4.0 
 
   Modified  13 (38.2)  17 (85)  -3.3  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
N      34 (100)  47 (100) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. * p <.05 if adjusted residual > 1.96.  Overall Chi square c2(2) = 39.99, p <.0001 
Main Study Procedures 
Eligible participants were given a link through MTurk that allowed access to a survey 
hosted by Qualtrics (Appendix ‘A’). The survey instructions detailed a participant’s right to 
cease voluntary participation at any time and clarified that taking the survey is an admission of 
informed consent.  The university’s human subjects’ committee approved all methods and 
measures.  
After confirming juror eligibility and completing demographic questions, each participant 
was randomly assigned to one of six conditions (2x3).  The conditions began by varying jury 
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instructions to include the “standard pattern” instructions from the Federal Fifth Circuit 
(including Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi) (2014), the “punitive” instructions using the 
standard instructions with the addition of the punitive segment from the State California Civil 
Jury Instructions (2015), and the “modified” instructions intended to combat mum effect.  After 
reading the assigned jury instructions, participants responded to measures assessing perceptions 
of clarity and punishment.  
Participants then watched a randomly assigned 15-minute juror deliberation video 
containing an instance or absence of juror misconduct.  Following the video, participants were 
asked to assess whether there were any instances of juror behavior during the deliberations they 
watched that should be reported.  If the participant answered yes, he or she was then asked to 
explain his or his answer in an open-ended response.  Next, each participant was asked whether 
he or she would report any behavior he or she witnessed during the video.  Those who answered 
yes were then asked how they would report in an open-ended response.  Participants then 
completed a series of attention check and manipulation check questions, followed by topical 
questions pertaining to litigation. All completed measures are listed in Appendix ‘A’.  
This experiment employed videotaped deliberations to fully capture verbal and nonverbal 
cues as opposed to transcripts (McAuliff & Kovera, 2012). However, participants read the jury 
instructions to control for confounding variables that could affect credibility such as nonverbal 
demeanor, likability, or confidence (Cramer, Brodsky, & DeCoster, 2009). Although it was not 
explicitly stated, participants were led to believe that the transcriptions were from a real trial, and 





Approximately 312 jury eligible adults were recruited through Amazon’s MTurk to 
participate in this study.  To be considered jury eligible in the United States, participants must 
meet six legal requirements (listed in Appendix ‘A’). Participants were adults recruited through 
Amazon’s MTurk and paid a subsidy of two dollars for their completion of the study.  Up to one 
dollar in “bonus money” was also paid to participants for correct answers to manipulation check 
and attention check questions to encourage attentiveness and effort.  
These true/false questions included: “During deliberations, there was a recess for jurors 
to take are of personal needs.”  “During deliberations, the jury decided the patent was infringed.” 
“During deliberations, the jury chose to award damages to Salco (the Plaintiff).” “During 
deliberations, a member of the jury shared the results of his Google internet search.”  “The jury 
instructions ask that jurors do not bring their children to court.” “Jury instructions are to be 
followed by jurors in a trial.” “The jury instructions ask jurors to turn off their cell phones.” 
“According to the jury instructions, there are personal consequences for a juror who does not 
follow the instructions.” “The jury instructions include specific directions and options as to how 
to go about reporting juror misconduct.” Participants who failed to answer all the attention and 
manipulation check questions correctly were removed from the sample.  This resulted in a 29% 
attrition rate. 
A total of 222 adults meeting all the requirements of a prospective juror participated in 
the study.  The sample was 49% female, with an average age of 40.09 (SD = 11.18, range 22-69).  
The race or ethnicity of these adults was 78% Caucasian, 7% Black, 4% Hispanic, 7% Asian, 
.5% Native American, and 4% “other.” The highest level of education completed was: 12% high 
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school or GED, 22% some college, 3% certificate or apprenticeship, 14% a two-year degree, 
40% a four-year degree, and 10% a graduate degree. 
 Researchers (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 
2010) have found MTurk samples to be more demographically diverse than standard internet 
samples and American college samples.  Buhrmester et al. (2011) also found that compensation 
levels for participants do not appear to affect data quality but may reduce data collection speed.  
Non-response error was also found to be less of a concern using MTurk samples than in Internet 
convenience samples recruited another way (Paolacci et al., 2010).  Most importantly, 
Buhrmester et al. (2011) found that “the quality of data provided by MTurk met or exceeded the 
psychometric standards associated with published research” (p. 5).  MTurk served as a useful 
tool to quickly and inexpensively recruit a demographically diverse sample with quality data.  
Measurements 
First, juror eligibility and demographic information were collected prior to the 
administering of experimental procedures.  Then, based on the concepts present in the extant 
research, scales were developed to measure the constructs of clarity and punishment in the jury 
instructions. Based on Chesebro’s (1988) definition of clarity, a six-item bi-polar scale was 
developed.  It included the following descriptors:  clear/confusing, understandable/difficult to 
understand, they made sense/they did not make sense, straight forward/complicated, 
comprehensible/incomprehensible, I get them/I don’t get them (a = .93).  These bi-polar scales 
were coded to place perceptions of clarity at one, and confusion at seven.  Based on Miller and 
Vidmar’s (1981) definition of punishment, a four-item bi-polar scale was developed.  It included 
the following descriptors: rewarding/punishing, lenient/harsh, tolerant/punitive, 
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forgiving/vindictive (a = .72).  Perceptions of tolerance were represented by one on the scale and 
punishment at seven. 
One item was used to assess participant’s perceptions of misconduct during deliberations.  
In each of the conditions, participants were asked, “Imagine yourself as a juror on this panel, 
based on the jury instructions you read, did you view anything during the deliberations that 
should be reported?” Responses were measure on a binary yes/no scale.  If the participant 
answered yes, he or she was then asked to “Please explain your answer” in an open-ended 
response for descriptive/explanatory purposes. 
Participants were then asked, “Imagine yourself as a juror on this panel, would YOU 
report juror misconduct in this case?” Responses were measure on a binary yes/no scale.  This 
singular item is representative of the ultimate and binary choice empaneled jurors face during 
deliberations.  Those who answered yes were then asked, “If so, how would you report?” in an 
open-ended response for descriptive/explanatory purposes. 
A series of items followed the mediated items, and were used to assess participants’ 
understanding of the case and attentiveness to the jury deliberations.  The attention check and 
manipulation check questions were ordered as to avoid priming participants by drawing attention 
to misconduct or reporting. At the conclusion of the survey, supplemental questions were 
included to conceal the intent of the study from the participants.   
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Research Question One 
The research question asked whether the type of jury instructions would significantly 
affect participants’ perceptions of clarity.  This question was analyzed using a one-way ANOVA.  
The results indicated that the type of jury instructions (i.e., standard, punitive, and modified 
instructions) did not have a significant effect on participants’ perceptions of clarity of the 
instructions, F (2, 219) = .267, p = .77, h2p= .002. Specifically, participants who received the 
standard jury instructions (M = 1.46, SD = .71), the punitive instructions (M = 1.39, SD = .83), 
and the modified instructions (M = 1.48, SD = .78), perceived the instructions as equally clear.  
Hypothesis One 
Hypothesis one predicted that, the type of jury instructions would affect participants’ 
perceptions of punishment. To test hypothesis two, a one-way ANOVA was conducted on 
perceptions of punishment in the three jury instructions conditions.  Results demonstrated that 
the three groups of participants significantly differed in their perceptions of punishment across 
the three jury instruction conditions (standard, punitive, modified) F (2, 219) = 9.48, p < .001, 
h2p= .08.  Post hoc comparisons using Fisher’s LSD indicated that the mean difference between 
the punitive condition (M = 4.64, SD = 1.11) and standard condition (M = 4.03, SD = .89) was 
significantly different.  In addition, the mean difference between the punitive condition (M = 
4.64, SD = 1.11) and the modified condition (M = 4.06, SD = .91) was also significant. There 
was no difference (M = .03, SD = .17) between the modified (M = 4.06, SD = .91) and standard 
conditions (M = 4.03, SD = .89).  Taken together, these results indicate that punitive instructions 
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were perceived as significantly more punishing than either the standard or modified instructions; 
therefore, hypothesis one was supported. 
Table 4  
Perceptions of clarity and punishment in jury instruction conditions 
    Standard  Punitive  Modified 
   ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Clarity M (SD)  1.46 (.71)a  1.39 (.83)a  1.48 (.78)a 
 
Punishment M (SD)  4.03 (.89)a  4.63 (1.11)b  4.06 (.92)a 
______________________________________________________________________________
Note: Means that do not share subscripts are significantly different (p < .001, Fisher’s LSD)  
 
Hypothesis Two 
Hypothesis two asserted that participants would perceive that juror misconduct occurred 
in each of the three jury instruction conditions (standard, punitive, modified) when misconduct 
was present as a condition.  Cross-tabulation analysis was conducted to ascertain the difference 
in perceptions of misconduct in the six experimental conditions.  Based on the results of the 
analysis, perceptions of misconduct did not differ by group, c2(2) = 1.24, p = .54. Participants 
correctly identified jury misconduct when it was present as a condition, and therefore, hypothesis 




Perceptions of misconduct across jury instruction conditions and video conditions 
      Count/ Percent within misconduct 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                                     Misconduct 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Video   Instructions  Yes   No  Adjusted 
Residual 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Misconduct  Standard  37 (38.1%)  0     
 
   Punitive  33 (34)   0    
   
   Modified  27 (27.8)  3   
_________________________________________________________________________ 
N      97 (100)  3 (100)  100  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
No Misconduct Standard  3 (43)   33 (32.2) n<5  
 
   Punitive  3 (43)   45 (39.1) n<5  
 
   Modified  1 (14)   34 (28.7) n<5  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
N      7 (100)   115 (100) 122  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. * p <.05 if adjusted residual > 1.96.    Overall Chi square c2(2) = 1.24, p = .54 
Hypothesis Three 
Hypothesis three predicted that the jury instructions would have ordered success in 
enhancing participants’ reporting of misconduct with the modified instructions as most effective, 
followed by the standard instructions, and the punitive instructions as least effective.  Cross-
tabulation analysis was used to test hypothesis four. As reporting of misconduct was measured 
dichotomously (i.e., yes or no). Cross-tabulation analysis was appropriate to examine the effects 
of the type of jury instructions on reporting within each video condition.  
The type of jury instructions had no effect on reporting within the misconduct condition. 
Chi square analysis performed on participants’ reporting of misconduct in the video condition 
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containing misconduct was not significant, c2(2) = 1.31, p = .52. Chi square analysis performed 
on participants’ reporting of misconduct in the video condition containing no misconduct was 
not significant, c2(2) = 4.05, p = .13. Participants did not change reporting behaviors regardless 
of the jury instructions they were presented. None of the three sets of jury instructions 
significantly influenced participant reporting; therefore, hypothesis three was not supported. 
Table 6 
Reports of misconduct across jury instruction conditions and video conditions 
      Count/ Percent within report 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
                                     Reporting 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Video   Instructions  Yes   No  Adjusted 
           Residual 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Misconduct  Standard  31 (39.2%)  6 (28.6%) .9  
 
   Punitive  24 (30.4)  9 (42.9) -1.1  
   
   Modified  24 (30.4)  6 (28.6 ) .2  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
N      79 (100)  21 (100) 100  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
No Misconduct Standard  2 (28.5)  38 (95)  n < 5  
 
   Punitive  5 (71.4 )  43 (37.4) 1.8  
 
   Modified  0    34 (29.4) n < 5  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
N      7 (100)   115 (100) 122  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. * p <.05 if adjusted residual > 1.96.  Overall Chi square c2(2) = .89, p = .64 
  
   
Additional Analyses 
Chi square analysis performed on participants’ perceptions of misconduct on the 
reporting of misconduct across all conditions was significant, c2(2) = 126.34, p < .001.  
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Therefore, participants indicated overwhelmingly across all conditions that if they witnessed 
misconduct, they would report the misconduct. A simple examination of descriptive statistics 
shows that 97% of participants reported viewing misconduct when it happened, and 95% of 
participants reported no misconduct when it was not present.   
Perceptions of misconduct. Open-ended responses indicated that of the 97% of 
participants who correctly reported viewing misconduct, 99% of those who recognized 
misconduct explained that the instance occurred when one of the jurors conducted extralegal 
research via the internet and reported his findings to the jury: 
“One juror talked about researching the case online, which is an obvious violation of the 
jury instructions.” 
“The guy that was talking about looking stuff up on the internet was against the jury 
instructions.” 
“The dumb guy admitted to researching the defendant and the patent at stake online, 
which was strictly prohibited by the jury instructions.” 
Only one participant indicated a different reason for his or her perception of juror misconduct: 
“For civil trials, almost one-third of states only require a majority for a verdict. Some 
states require a majority if the money at issue in the trial is below a certain amount, and 
a unanimous verdict all other times.” 
Reporting misconduct. Eighty-two percent of the participants who indicated they 
witnessed misconduct during the deliberations indicated that they would report the misconduct.  
Seventy-nine percent of reporting participants specified that they would report to various court 
officials including the bailiff or judge. 
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“I would ask to speak with the bailiff and report what I witnessed immediately to the 
bailiff.” 
“I'd go to the judge immediately. If the judge wasn't available, I'd ask the bailiff or one of 
the other officials in the courtroom to get him immediately.” 
“I would report the violation to the judge immediately. The next time I had access to the 
judge, I would feel completely obligated to tell him or her what I had heard the other 
judge saying. Since all the jurors have now heard this information, we're all tainted now. 
I would report it ASAP.” 
Sixteen percent of the reporting jurors specifically indicated that they would report the 
occurrence to the judge/bailiff privately or anonymously.   
“I would try to speak to a guard privately and indiscreetly, like needing to use the 
restroom and then quietly reporting the incident to them.” 
“I would see if I would pull aside the judge or bailiff and let them know a juror had 
looked up information online and shared it with the rest of us. As privately as possible.” 
“I would pass a not to the bailiff asking if I could speak to him privately.” 
Two participants expressed uncertainty regarding reporting.  
“I'm not sure. I say I would, but I would be hesitant. Firstly, I wouldn't want to be there 
any longer or cause a mistrial. Second, I wouldn't want that nice man to be 
fined/arrested/held in contempt.   If I DID report it, I would go tell the person who 
provided those juror instructions. It said ‘please report it to me immediately’. But I'm not 
totally sure I would go through with it, especially since it didn't seem to change the 




Eighteen percent of participants indicated that despite acknowledging the misconduct, 
they would not report its occurrence.  While not directly asked to explain this decision, one 
participant wrote: 
“Utter ridiculous uneconomic and fallacious arguments in favor of a barbaric practice of 
awarding money to the people who ‘got there first’ even though they did nothing with the 
tech.  I would absolutely NOT report the coward who Googled the patent troll and then 
didn't have the sense to conceal it by proposing that the plaintiff could be a patent troll 
without admitting to using google as a source, then utterly failing to defend his position.” 
Cross-tabulation analysis was conducted to ascertain whether the jury instructions made a 
difference in the above participants’ choice not to report. Based on the results of the analysis, 
perceptions of the decision not to report did vary by group, c2(2) = 6.60, p = .037.  While this 
does seem to indicate the presence of the mum effect, these results are the converse to the 
overarching results that the decision to report does not vary by jury instruction condition. The 











Non-reporting across jury instruction conditions 
 
      Count/ Percent within jury instruction condition 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
                      Reporting 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Video   Instructions  No   Adjusted 
         Residual 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Misconduct  Standard  4 (11%)   -.8 
 
   Punitive  9 (27%)   2.4* 
   
   Modified  1 (4%)   -1.8 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
N      14     
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. * p <.05 if adjusted residual > 1.96.  Overall Chi square c2(2) = .6.60, p = .037 
  
Summary 
 Research question one asked whether the jury instructions would significantly affect 
participant’s perceptions of clarity; the results indicated that they do not.  Hypothesis one posited 
that the jury instructions would significantly affect participants’ perceptions of punishment, and 
this hypothesis was supported.  
 Hypothesis two asserted that participants would perceive that juror misconduct occurred 
in each of the conditions (standard, punitive, modified) when misconduct is present as a 
condition.  Results indicated that participants correctly perceived misconduct in each of the jury 
instructions conditions when it was present; this hypothesis was supported. 
Hypothesis three was not supported.  The results indicated that there are not significant 
differences in participants’ reporting of misconduct in any of the experimental conditions.  The 
jury instructions did not have a significant effect on juror reporting as previously posited. 
Participants overwhelmingly indicated in their open-ended responses across all 
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conditions that if they witnessed misconduct, they would report the misconduct.   
Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 This chapter includes a discussion of the research question, hypotheses, and the overall 
conclusions.  The implications of this study, its limitations, and proposed areas for future 
research are also explored. 
Research Question One 
 Participants did not perceive a difference in clarity across the three sets of jury 
instructions.  Each of the three sets of jury instructions incorporated the “standard” instructions 
from the Federal Fifth Circuit Civil Courts (2014) as the foundation.  The “punitive” instructions 
embedded a paragraph from The State California Civil Jury Instructions (2015) in the standard 
instructions to outline the personal consequences to jurors who engage in misconduct.  The 
“modified” instructions also incorporated a paragraph written to mitigation the effects of the 
mum effect into the standard instructions.  Based on the results, these additions of text were not 
significant enough to enhance or reduce clarity across conditions. 
Hypothesis One 
As anticipated, the punitive jury instructions were perceived by participants to be more 
punishing than the standard or modified instructions.  The addition of the language used in The 
State California Civil Jury Instructions (2015) was considered “punitive” in its attempt to address 
and criminalize social media usage, misuse of technology, and extralegal Internet searches 
(Aligoro, 2014; Hoffmeister, 2015). Based on these results, participants acknowledged the 
repercussions of engaging in juror misconduct and perceived the instructions to be punishing in 
nature.   
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 Conversely, participants did not find the standard or modified instructions to be as 
punishing as the punitive instructions, or even significantly different from one another.  These 
two sets of jury instructions did not include any personal consequences for a juror who engaged 
in misconduct.  However, both the standard and modified jury instructions briefly outlined 
consequences to the legal system should misconduct occur.  The standard instructions from the 
Federal Fifth Circuit Civil Courts (2014) explains to jurors: 
Each of the parties is entitled to a fair trial by an impartial jury, and you must conduct 
yourself so as to maintain the integrity of the trial process. If you decide the case based 
on information not presented in court, you will have denied the parties a fair trial in 
accordance with the rules of this country and you will have done an injustice. It is very 
important that you abide by these rules. Failure to follow these instructions could result in 
the case having to be retried. (p. 2) 
 While the legal consequences (e.g. declaring mistrial, denying a fair trial, removing the juror) 
could be viewed as punishing, the instances of personal consequences outlined in the punitive 
instructions affected participant perceptions to a greater degree. 
Hypothesis Two 
As hypothesized, participants were able perceive that juror misconduct occurred in each 
of the three jury instruction conditions (standard, punitive, modified) when misconduct was 
present as a condition.  While some legal scholars (e.g. Marder, 2006; Steele & Thornburg, 
1988) have expressed concern regarding the ability of jurors to understand and follow jury 
instructions, the results of this study indicate that the three sets of jury instructions were not 
misleading to participants.    
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The rhetoric used to describe the responsibilities and conditions surrounding juror service 
did not mislead jurors to falsely report misconduct when it was not present.  The addition of 
consequences to the system, consequences to the individual, or specific instructions used in the 
modified instructions meant to combat the mum effect did not affect participants’ ability to 
correctly identify misconduct when it was present as a condition.  Therefore, there is no evidence 
to suggest that any of these three sets of instructions, if adopted by a court, would increase 
instances of false reporting. 
Hypothesis Three 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the jury instructions did not have ordered success in  
enhancing participants’ reporting of misconduct.  Instead, the three sets of jury instructions had 
no effect participants’ reporting.  As described above, participants were able to correctly identify 
juror misconduct across all three conditions when it was present as a condition.  As previously 
discussed, the results indicated a strong relationship between perceptions of misconduct and 
reporting misconduct.  Participants across the three jury instruction conditions indicated that if 
they perceived there to be misconduct, they would report the misconduct.  This finding was 
further reified by the open-ended responses which correctly identified the instance of misconduct 
and indicated participants’ intent to report to court authorities.  
 These results are at odds with extant research regarding the mum effect.  While Rosen et 
al. (1972) found that participants are more likely to report undesirable news if given the direct 
responsibility to report, jurors in these conditions indicated they would report misconduct even 
when no direct responsibility was given.  Similarly, Smith, Keil, and Depledge (2001) found that 
participants assuming the role of manager were more likely to report due to a perceived explicit 
individual responsibility to do so.  Although participants in this study were asked to imagine 
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themselves as one of the panel of eight jurors, the results indicated that participants would report 
misconduct across all jury instruction conditions.  The modified instructions including language 
addressing the responsibility of all jurors to report did not enhance reporting. 
 Extant research also indicates that the mum effect is particularly salient in contexts where 
there is the upward movement of perceived undesirable news from a subordinate to a supervisor 
(Bisel et al. 2012; Milliken et al. 2003; Ploeger et al., 2011).  While a similar threat to face might 
exist for a juror reporting behavior to court officials, it is possible the organizational context was 
not fully applicable in this setting.  Although jurors do receive instructions and follow directions 
as laid out by the judge, they are not directly employed or face the same ongoing daily 
interaction as an employee would when interfacing with an employer.  The modified instructions 
which gave specific directions as to how to report the misconduct, in hopes of diminishing face 
threat, shared the same high rate of juror reporting as the standard and punitive conditions. 
 Bisel and Kramer (2013) advocate for the purposeful labeling of unethical behavior in 
order to mitigate instances of moral mum effect.  Although the modified instructions specifically 
labeled and named the behavior as “misconduct,” this set of jury instructions did not increase 
participant reporting.  Participants were able to correctly identify juror misconduct regardless of 
the assigned jury instruction, and indicated they would report when present. 
 It was hypothesized that the punitive instructions would be the least successful in 
inducing participant reporting of misconduct.  Smith, Keil, and Depledge (2001) found that 
participants were less likely to report bad news when they felt it would place them at risk of 
negative consequences. While these instructions outlined consequences for the offender, they did 
not state consequences for a juror that reports the behavior.  Therefore, while participants 
believed the punitive instructions to be more punishing than the standard or modified 
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instructions, it is possible they did not view the instructions to be punishing them.  Instead, the 
consequences to the judicial system or the consequences to the offending juror did not dissuade 
participants from reporting. 
Theoretical Contributions 
 The results of this study provide additional analysis for use in the ongoing examination of 
the mum effect.  Extant research examining the mum effect in organizational and interpersonal 
contexts did not translate as hypothesized into this study.  Instead, when confronted with 
undesirable information, participants indicated that they would report to court authorities.     
Although extant research (Bell, 2010; Grow, 2010; Sunwolf & Siebold, 1998) implies the 
presence of the mum effect operating the in the courtroom context, this study was unable to 
create a situation which produced the effect.  While it is possible that participants imagining 
themselves as empaneled jurors hold such reverence for the judicial process that they are able to 
overcome the mum effect, it seems more likely that the experimental conditions necessary to 
conduct the study reduce the ecological validity to such a degree that participants over estimate 
their willingness to report. 
Hoffmeister (2011) notes that juror misconduct is a historically understudied area of the 
law which requires to jurors to accurately self-report or report instances of juror misconduct.  
Similarly, studying the presence of the mum effect in cases of juror misconduct requires 
participants to accurately self-report and resist social desirability bias.  The experimental context 
further reduces ecological validity by removing any pretense that the participants’ decisions 
would be binding or produce consequences. 
Sunwolf and Siebold (1998) found that when faced with an instance of juror misconduct, 
39% of the rules constructed by participants resulted in jurors choosing to disregard the 
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information. Only 21% of the rules developed by participants resulted in reporting the 
misconduct to the judge.  These results seem to indicate that the researchers were able to to 
produce a scenario in which participants chose to remain silent rather than report the 
undesireable information.  Future studies should consider using an interview protocol similar to 
the work of Sunwolf and Siebold (1998) to allow for more robust and detailed responses. 
The open-ended responses indicated that sixteen percent of the reporting jurors would 
prefer to report misconduct privately or anonymously.  This indicates that for some participants, 
reporting misconduct openly may still serve as a face threat or result in varying levels of the 
mum effect.  Future studies could examine the protocol participants say they would use to report 
misconduct to examine the use of equivocation or anonymity often used to mitigate the mum 
effect (Bisel & Kramer, 2013).   
Practical Implications 
 The results of this study indicate that amending jury instructions with the intent of 
encouraging jurors to report instances of misconduct is not efficacious.  This is especially 
important to note in states which might consider amending jury instructions to combat 
misconduct reports. These results indicate that further efforts to rhetorically enhance reporting 
make no significant difference.  Overall, participants who reported witnessing misconduct also 
indicated that they would report the misconduct observed.  Therefore, it would not be a worthy 
use of the Courts’ resources to spend time and money developing new jury instructions with the 
goal of reducing mum effect and encouraging reporting. 
 Instead, the results indicate that when jurors can identify the behavior as misconduct, 
they are likely to report.  Therefore, courts should continue to include specific examples of the 
behaviors that constitute misconduct.  The three sets of jury instructions used in this study 
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contained identical language defining and outlining forms of misconduct.  The instance of 
misconduct that took place in the experimental condition was specifically outlined as a banned 
behavior in each of the three instruction conditions.  The results of the study suggest that when 
jurors can see the misconduct, they are likely to say something about the misconduct. 
 Finally, while participants found the punitive instructions to be significantly more 
punishing than the other two sets of instructions, they did not make a significant difference in 
participants’ reporting.  Therefore, should other states choose to follow California’s example, 
and criminalize jury misconduct, there is no evidence to support residual negative effects on 
juror reporting, nor any benefits. 
 This study has important practical implications for the justice system.  In this context 
where precedence is critical, and justices are concerned with the implications of amending jury 
instructions should they face appeal, there is no evidence to suggest that time and resources 
should be allocated to change the language in jury instructions with the goal of enhancing juror 
reporting of misconduct. 
Limitations 
 There are several potential limitations that should be considered.  First, participants 
viewed a video of jury deliberations instead of taking part in them.  While the video condition 
ensured content and delivery were maintained across the two experimental conditions, it does not 
allow participants to engage in deliberations the way they would if they were empaneled on a 
jury.  Therefore, it is possible that participants did not experience the same pressures to conform, 
reach a verdict, or negotiate face in the manner an empaneled jury would.  Participants also knew 
their answers were not binding, and therefore, their decisions and actions may not have been 
made with the same rigor of an empaneled jury. 
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 Also, since participants were making decisions in an experimental context as opposed to 
real juror deliberations, it is possible that participants did not feel the same threat to face or fear 
the changes to group dynamics that might have occurred in a real context. The design of this 
study was based on extant research (Bisel & Kramer, 2013; Rosen & Tesser, 1972; Smith, Keil, 
& Depedge, 2001) that effectively tested the mum effect through hypothetical scenarios wherein 
participants were also asked to “consider the following” and respond.  However, due to the 
experimental context, participants also knew that the results of their choices were not binding, 
and therefore, may have elected to select “the correct answer” and not have taken into 
consideration the full implications of their decisions.   
Next, participants were recruited using Amazon’s MTurk.  While extant research has 
defended the use of MTurk as a viable means of participant recruitment (Buhrmester et al., 2011; 
Paolacci et al., 2010), these individuals receive payment for their services and are accustomed to 
taking surveys and completing measures.  While the sample was indicative of the demographics 
that would be called for juror service, the criticism could be levied that these individuals self-
select into the study and are more familiar with the types of questions and answers included than 
those empaneled on a typical jury. 
Lastly, it is possible that the rigorous design of the study removed prospective 
participants that would have responded differently to questions concerning the mum effect.  
Participants were required to correctly answer at least seven attention and manipulation check 
questions.  Those who failed to answer even one question accurately were removed from the 
sample.  While this protocol increased the rigor of the study and enhanced the validity of the 
measures, it does mean that people who serve everyday on juries, and might fail to answer 
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questions about the jury instructions correctly, were removed from the pool.  The rigorous steps 
taken to enhance accurate reporting might have reduced the ecological validity.   
This limitation highlights the tension between conducting good research and preserving 
ecological validity.  While some empaneled jurors may listen carefully, take notes on protocols, 
and strictly adhere to the nuances of the law, it is also possible that some empaneled jurors may 
not be able to answer attention-check questions were they to be administered after the jury 
instructions.  The rigor of this design does not account for instances of the mum effect which 
could occur in the portion of removed participants. 
Future Research 
 There are several areas for future research to pursue.  First, this study included an overt 
instance of juror misconduct.  All three sets of jury instructions specifically ban jurors from 
engaging in outside internet research on any aspect of the case.  The juror in the misconduct 
condition also overtly stated that he had conducted a Google search at home and discovered 
biasing information.  Not all jury misconduct is as overt and can be introduced through subtext 
(i.e. I heard that the Plaintiff has sued multiple companies and that’s how he makes money). 
Future research should examine the effects of levels of misconduct or types of misconduct on the 
likelihood of reporting.  
 In the current study, the example of misconduct did not play a large role in the outcome 
of the jurors’ deliberations.  While the empaneled jurors did agree to lower their damage amount 
slightly, the offending juror did not significantly sway the outcome of the trial.  Future research 
should also consider varying levels of the effects of the misconduct on verdict and the likelihood 
of reporting.  It would be important to learn if jurors are more likely to report misconduct when 
they perceive the offense to have a greater effect on verdict. 
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 Lastly, future research could also examine the role of the other deliberating jurors when 
misconduct occurs.  Conditions could be varied to include levels of intervention to measure the 
effects on reporting.  It could also have important implications for the justice system to learn 
whether jurors are less likely to report instances of misconduct if fellow jurors intervene and 
condemn the behavior while it is occurring rather than awkwardly ignoring it, or asking for more 
information.   
Conclusion 
 Results indicate that participants can correctly identify misconduct across the three jury 
instruction conditions when it is present as a condition.  While the mum effect serves as a strong 
theoretical framework for study in the judicial context, the results of this study indicate juror 
reporting of misconduct is not significantly altered across the three jury instruction conditions.  
Instead, when jurors can identify the misconduct they state that they would report it.  This 
provides important knowledge for those who continue to work to uphold the rigor and sanctity of 
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Information Statement.  The department of Communication Studies at the University of Kansas 
supports the practice of protection for human subjects participating in research.  The following 
information is provided for you to decide whether you wish to participate in the present 
study.  You should be aware that even if you agree to participate, you are free to withdraw at any 
time without penalty.    We are conducting this study to better understand jury deliberations in 
civil trials.  This will entail you watching a short video of mock jury deliberations and 
completing a survey.  Your participation is expected to take approximately 25-35 minutes.  
Although participation may not benefit you directly, we believe that the information obtained 
from this study will help us gain a better understanding of jury deliberations in civil trials.  Your 
participation is solicited, although strictly voluntary.  You name will not be associated in any 
way with the research findings, as only aggregated, not individualized, data will be shared or 
published.  Additionally, your identifiable information will not be shared unless (a) it is required 
by law or university policy, or (b) you give written permission.  It is possible, however, with 
internet communications, that through intent or accident someone other than the intended 
recipient may see your response.  If you would like additional information concerning this study 
before or after it is completed, please feel free to contact us by phone or mail.   Completion of 
the survey indicates your willingness to take part in this study and that you are at least 18 years 
old.  If you have any additional questions about your rights as a research participant, you may 
call (785) 864-7429 or write the Human Subjects Committee Lawrence Campus (HSCL), 
University of Kansas, 2385 Irving Hill Road, Lawrence, Kansas 66045-7563, email, irb@ku.edu. 
Sincerely,  Hailey Drescher, M.S. Principal Investigator Bailey Hall University of Kansas 
Lawrence, KS 66045 (214) 789-5256 haileydrescher @ku.edu     Dr. Thomas Beisecker Faculty 
Supervisor Department of Communication Studies Bailey Hall University of Kansas (785) 864-
9882 south40@ku.edu   
 
To continue with this study, please click the double arrow button to acknowledge that you 
understand the content presented in the above information statement. 
 
The following questions address your background.  Please answer each to the best of your 
ability. 
 
To be legally qualified for jury service, an individual must:-  be a United States citizen;-  be at 
least 18 years of age;-  be adequately proficient in English;- have no intellectual disability;- not 
currently be subject to felony charges punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;- 
never have been convicted of a felony (unless civil rights have been legally restored)To your 
knowledge, do you meet the requirements to serve on a jury? 
m Yes 
m No 
m I'm not sure 
 





What is your race? Choose all that you feel apply. 
q White/Caucasian 
q African American/Black 
q Hispanic 
q Asian 
q Native American 
q Pacific Islander 
q Other ____________________ 
 
How old are you? 
______ Age 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
m Some grade school 
m High School / GED 
m Some College 
m Certificate or Apprenticeship (e.g., medical assistant, firefighter, welder, etc.) 
m 2-year College Degree (e.g. Associate’s degree) 
m 4-year College Degree (e.g., BA, BS) 
m Master’s Degree (e.g., MA, MFA, MS, MBA) 
m Doctoral or Professional Degree (e.g., PhD, JD, MD, DVM, DDS, etc.) 
 






m Other, please specify ____________________ 
 
BONUS MONEY OPPORTUNITY   You have the potential to earn BONUS MONEY during 
this study by paying close attention to all of the readings and videos. Questions in sections 
marked BONUS MONEY have correct answers.  Up to $1 (total) in bonus money will be added 
for correct answers to those questions following the completion and review of your survey. 
 
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY  We are conducting this study to better understand the role of 
communication during jury deliberations. The following are jury instructions written and read by 
a judge prior to juror deliberations in a civil trial.  Please read the following jury 
instructions carefully and fully in preparation to answer the questions that follow.        









The following statements ask your opinion regarding the jury instructions you read.  Please 
answer each to the best of your ability. 
 
Please rate your opinion of the jury instructions you read on the following scales.    
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Clear:Confusing m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	
Helping:Hurting m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	
Understandable:Difficult to 
understand m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	
Rewarding:Punishing m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	
They made sense:They did not 
make sense m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	
Lenient:Harsh m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	
Straight Forward:Complicated m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	
Tolerant:Punitive m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	
Comprehensible:Incomprehensible m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	
Lax:Strict m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	
I get them:I don't get them m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	
Forgiving:Vindictive m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	 m 	
 
 
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY    The following jury deliberations are taken from a civil trial in 
which Salco (the Plaintiff) claims its patent was infringed (used without permission or rights) by 
Quintech (the Defendant).  This means that Salco believes its patent was stolen and that Quintech 
should pay it money.  The jury must decide whether the patent was infringed, and what monetary 
amount of damages, if any, should be awarded to Salco.  Please watch the following 15-minute 
juror deliberation video carefully and fully in preparation to answer the questions that follow.  
The link for the video appears on the next page.   
**The survey will not advance until the video ends.** 
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Imagine yourself as a juror on this panel, based on the jury instructions you read, did you view 




Please explain your answer. 
 
Imagine yourself as one of the jurors in the video you just watched, would YOU report juror 




If so, how would you report? 
 
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY- POSSIBLE BONUS MONEY    Basing your answers on the 
jury deliberations you watched, please answer the following true/false and yes/no questions.  
Select "True" if you believe the statement is a true and accurate account of what you heard, or 
"False" if you believe the statement to be false or an inaccurate account of what you heard. 
 
















PLEASE READ CAREFULLY- POSSIBLE BONUS MONEY    Basing your answers on the 
jury deliberations you watched, please answer the following true/false and yes/no 
questions.    Select "True" if you believe the statement is a true and accurate account of what you 
















PLEASE READ CAREFULLY- POSSIBLE BONUS MONEY    Basing your answers on the 
jury instructions you read, please answer the following true/false and yes/no questions.    Select 
"True" if you believe the statement is a true and accurate account of what you heard, or "False" if 
you believe the statement to be false or an inaccurate account of what you heard. 
 












PLEASE READ CAREFULLY- POSSIBLE BONUS MONEY    Basing your answers on the 
jury instructions you read, please answer the following true/false and yes/no questions.    Select 
"True" if you believe the statement is a true and accurate account of what you heard, or "False" if 
you believe the statement to be false or an inaccurate account of what you heard. 
 













According to the jury instructions, there are personal consequences for a juror who does not 








PLEASE READ CAREFULLY-  POSSIBLE BONUS MONEY    Basing your answers on the 
jury instructions you read, please answer the following true/false and yes/no questions.    Select 
"True" if you believe the statement is a true and accurate account of what you heard, or "False" if 
you believe the statement to be false or an inaccurate account of what you heard. 
 

















Directions:  Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements.   There are no correct or incorrect answers- we are interested in your opinions.           
 
67 
The majority of lawsuits are frivolous. 
m Strongly disagree 
m Disagree 
m Somewhat disagree 
m Somewhat agree 
m Agree 
m Strongly agree 
 
Companies should only be awarded patents if they are going to make something with it. 
m Strongly disagree 
m Disagree 
m Somewhat disagree 
m Somewhat agree 
m Agree 
m Strongly agree 
 
Businesses that operate as non-practicing entities (do not produce a good or service) should not 
be awarded damages in patent infringement cases. 
m Strongly disagree 
m Disagree 
m Somewhat disagree 
m Somewhat agree 
m Agree 
m Strongly agree 
 
As the owner of a patent, a person or company is entitled to enforce the patent by seeking 
licenses or royalties from those who use it. 
m Strongly disagree 
m Disagree 
m Somewhat disagree 
m Somewhat agree 
m Agree 
m Strongly agree 
 
Companies have a right to protect their patents through litigation. 
m Strongly disagree 
m Disagree 
m Somewhat disagree 
m Somewhat agree 
m Agree 
m Strongly agree 
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If the Patent and Trademark Office issues a patent, the patent is ultimately valid. 
m Strongly disagree 
m Disagree 
m Somewhat disagree 
m Somewhat agree 
m Agree 
m Strongly agree 
 
Are you familiar with the term "patent troll"? 
m Yes, I have heard and understand the term. 
m I have heard the term, but I am not certain of what it means. 
m No, I have never heard the term. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study.  Your thoughts are important to us.  If 
you have any additional comments, please feel free to write them in the space below.  When you 








1.1 Instructions for Beginning of Trial 
 
Members of the jury panel, if you have a cell phone, PDA, Blackberry, smart phone, iPhone or 
any other wireless communication device with you, please take it out now and turn it off. Do not 
turn it to vibrate or silent; power it down. During jury selection, you must leave it off. 
There are certain rules you must follow while participating in this trial. 
 
First, you may not communicate with anyone about the case, including your fellow jurors, until it 
is time to deliberate. I understand you may want to tell your family, close friends and other 
people that you have been called for jury service so that you can explain when you are required 
to be in court. You should warn them not to ask you about this case, tell you anything they know 
or think they know about it, or discuss this case in your presence, until after I accept your verdict 
or excuse you as a juror. 
 
Similarly, you must not give any information to anyone by any means about this case. For 
example, do not talk face-to-face or use any electronic device or media, such as the telephone, a 
cell or smart phone, camera, recording device, Blackberry, PDA, computer, the Internet, any 
Internet service, any text or instant messaging service, any Internet chat room, blog, or website 
such as Facebook, MySpace, YouTube, or Twitter, or any other way to communicate to anyone 
any information about this case until I accept your verdict or until you have been excused as a 
juror. This includes any information about the parties, witnesses, participants, claims, charges, 
evidence, or anything else related to this case. 
 
Second, do not speak with anyone in or around the courthouse other than your fellow jurors or 
court personnel. Some of the people you encounter may have some connection to the case. If you 
were to speak with them, that could create an appearance or raise a suspicion of impropriety. 
 
Third, do not do any research—on the Internet, in libraries, in books, newspapers, magazines, or 
using any other source or method. Do not make any investigation about this case on your own. 
Do not visit or view any place discussed in this case and do not use Internet programs or other 
devices to search for or view any place discussed in the testimony. Do not in any way research 
any information about this case, the law, or the people involved, including the parties, the 
witnesses, the lawyers, or the judge, until after you have been excused as jurors. If you happen to 
see or hear anything touching on this case in the media, turn away and report it to me as soon as 
possible. 
 
These rules protect the parties' right to have this case decided only on evidence they know about, 
that has been presented here in court. If you do any research, investigation or experiment that we 
do not know about, or gain any information through improper communications, then your verdict 
may be influenced by inaccurate, incomplete or misleading information that has not been tested 
by the trial process, which includes the oath to tell the truth and cross-examination. It could also 
be unfair to the parties' right to know what information the jurors are relying on to decide the 
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case. Each of the parties is entitled to a fair trial by an impartial jury, and you must conduct 
yourself so as to maintain the integrity of the trial process. If you decide the case based on 
information not presented in court, you will have denied the parties a fair trial in accordance with 
the rules of this country and you will have done an injustice. It is very important that you abide 







1.2 Instructions for Beginning of Trial 
 
Members of the jury panel, if you have a cell phone, PDA, Blackberry, smart phone, iPhone or 
any other wireless communication device with you, please take it out now and turn it off. Do not 
turn it to vibrate or silent; power it down. During jury selection, you must leave it off. 
There are certain rules you must follow while participating in this trial. 
 
First, you may not communicate with anyone about the case, including your fellow jurors, until it 
is time to deliberate. I understand you may want to tell your family, close friends and other 
people that you have been called for jury service so that you can explain when you are required 
to be in court. You should warn them not to ask you about this case, tell you anything they know 
or think they know about it, or discuss this case in your presence, until after I accept your verdict 
or excuse you as a juror. 
 
Similarly, you must not give any information to anyone by any means about this case. For 
example, do not talk face-to-face or use any electronic device or media, such as the telephone, a 
cell or smart phone, camera, recording device, Blackberry, PDA, computer, the Internet, any 
Internet service, any text or instant messaging service, any Internet chat room, blog, or website 
such as Facebook, MySpace, YouTube, or Twitter, or any other way to communicate to anyone 
any information about this case until I accept your verdict or until you have been excused as a 
juror. This includes any information about the parties, witnesses, participants, claims, charges, 
evidence, or anything else related to this case. 
 
Second, do not speak with anyone in or around the courthouse other than your fellow jurors or 
court personnel. Some of the people you encounter may have some connection to the case. If you 
were to speak with them, that could create an appearance or raise a suspicion of impropriety. 
 
Third, do not do any research—on the Internet, in libraries, in books, newspapers, magazines, or 
using any other source or method. Do not make any investigation about this case on your own. 
Do not visit or view any place discussed in this case and do not use Internet programs or other 
devices to search for or view any place discussed in the testimony. Do not in any way research 
any information about this case, the law, or the people involved, including the parties, the 
witnesses, the lawyers, or the judge, until after you have been excused as jurors. If you happen to 
see or hear anything touching on this case in the media, turn away and report it to me as soon as 
possible. 
 
If you violate any of these prohibitions on communications and research, including prohibitions 
on electronic communications and research, you may be held in contempt of court or face other 
sanctions. That means that you may have to serve time in jail, pay a fine, or face other 




Modified Instructions  
1.3 Instructions for Beginning of Trial 
 
Members of the jury panel, if you have a cell phone, PDA, Blackberry, smart phone, iPhone or 
any other wireless communication device with you, please take it out now and turn it off. Do not 
turn it to vibrate or silent; power it down. During jury selection, you must leave it off. 
There are certain rules you must follow while participating in this trial. 
 
First, you may not communicate with anyone about the case, including your fellow jurors, until it 
is time to deliberate. I understand you may want to tell your family, close friends and other 
people that you have been called for jury service so that you can explain when you are required 
to be in court. You should warn them not to ask you about this case, tell you anything they know 
or think they know about it, or discuss this case in your presence, until after I accept your verdict 
or excuse you as a juror. 
 
Similarly, you must not give any information to anyone by any means about this case. For 
example, do not talk face-to-face or use any electronic device or media, such as the telephone, a 
cell or smart phone, camera, recording device, Blackberry, PDA, computer, the Internet, any 
Internet service, any text or instant messaging service, any Internet chat room, blog, or website 
such as Facebook, MySpace, YouTube, or Twitter, or any other way to communicate to anyone 
any information about this case until I accept your verdict or until you have been excused as a 
juror. This includes any information about the parties, witnesses, participants, claims, charges, 
evidence, or anything else related to this case. 
 
Second, do not speak with anyone in or around the courthouse other than your fellow jurors or 
court personnel. Some of the people you encounter may have some connection to the case. If you 
were to speak with them, that could create an appearance or raise a suspicion of impropriety. 
 
Third, do not do any research—on the Internet, in libraries, in books, newspapers, magazines, or 
using any other source or method. Do not make any investigation about this case on your own. 
Do not visit or view any place discussed in this case and do not use Internet programs or other 
devices to search for or view any place discussed in the testimony. Do not in any way research 
any information about this case, the law, or the people involved, including the parties, the 
witnesses, the lawyers, or the judge, until after you have been excused as jurors.  
 
Taking part in any of the above instances is considered juror misconduct.  If a juror attempts to 
introduce any information researched from the Internet, books, or investigated from a source 
outside the courtroom, it is every juror’s responsibility to report this instance of misconduct 
immediately.  As an empaneled juror, it is your duty and responsibility to uphold the sanctity of 
the adversarial court system by reporting any instance of misconduct to the bailiff immediately.  
Do not rely on another juror to report- reporting is every juror’s responsibility.  The bailiff will 
escort you to and from the courtroom multiple times during your day/s in court.  Should you 
need to report misconduct, please ask to speak with the bailiff privately during one of these times 
or hand him/her a note asking to speak privately.  Reporting another juror’s misconduct should 
not be viewed as the jury’s failure.  Instead, reporting misconduct reflects on the integrity of the 
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jury to uphold the rigor of the process and the rights of the litigating parties.  Failure to report 










Salco v. Quintech 
Patent Infringement and Damages 
 
Jurors:  1, 8, 10, 12, 15, 21, 23 (Foreperson), 25 
 
 
#23-  Okay, question one-  (reads from jury instructions) Did Salco prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Quintech directly infringes claim 6 of the ‘948 patent?  Let’s take a vote and 
raise our hands. All who say yes?  Okay, those who say no? 
 
(She takes a vote- 5 yes #1, #12, #21, #23. #25, 3 no: #10, #15, #8) 
 
#12- Wait, did I misunderstand the question? 
 
#23- Yes, if you are in favor of Salco, and no if you are in favor of Quintech. 
 
#12- Ok, so I did it right. 
 
#23- Anybody want to volunteer an opinion of why you vote yes to infringement? 
 
#8- I think that even at the time, the lawyer for Quintech admitted that they had done it- that’s 
what I was getting out of it. I thought it was clear cut that Quintech definitely did it.  One little 
minor change, or a couple of changes is all they made. 
 
#25- I agree.  I agree with that.  Cause Quintech basically said yeah we did it, but Salco’s patent 
is not worth 140 million, it’s only worth 4 million.  They admitted it, so yeah, I’m with Salco. 
 
#23- Anybody else? 
 
#12- I just believe that it was proven that Quintech did infringe. 
 
#15- I think that the lawyer for Quintech was more interested in trying to get into the 
technicalities of it.  Instead of getting so technical about it and saying was it this button or this 
button or this thing or that thing.. he was more like, yes, they might have a button, but that is not 
the same.  But overall… yeah, I think that was. 
 
#8- Even when that lawyer came in, he kept saying, ‘if they really had a patent.’  I mean, come 
on, they had a patent. 
 
#15-  Right, it’s there (gestures to patent on table).  One thing I noticed as well, the defense 
lawyer, he kept on talking about how many people used the product.  It doesn’t matter.  It 
doesn’t matter if two people used the product, Quintech still infringed on the patent.   
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#1- That was something I had written down, it’s not a question of who is using it, it is a question 
that the patented technology is in there, and Quintech had full knowledge of what Mr. Jackson, 
the inventor, was trying to do, and they went and spent a lot of money to try to make the same 
thing, and refused to license Mr. Jackson’s technology, and now they’re trying to say, no we 
didn’t infringe.  That’s my thought. 
 
#8-  I’m kind of leaning toward Quintech on this.  I really don’t see where anything was proven 
against them.  Mr. Jackson, if he did have the patent rights, he never made a dollar off of it, he 
never marketed it. 
 
#1- Well, part of that is because he offered the technology to Quintech, and they refused the 
licensing of it, and they made it themselves. 
 
#8-  Yeah, well, I just didn’t see that, they were both working on it at the same time.  Quintech 
was working on the same project that Mr. Jackson was. 
 
#1-  But it’s a matter of who gets there first. 
 
#8- It just seemed like such a minor thing, like one little, what was it?  Like one little button…? 
 
#12-  A processor.  It’s more of a processor than a button.  But I think that since he did patent it, 
he deserves to get damages for what Quintech is infringing on.  Whether it is one time, two 
times, like the attorney said, or a hundred times… the bottom line is Quintech used it. 
 
#15-  We may not agree with the patent.  We may not agree with what is going on, but the 
bottom line is Mr. Jackson does have a patent with the US government, and Quintech did 
infringe on that patent whether we like it or not.  
 
#12-  Exactly. 
 
#25-  If Quintech had come up with it first, when Mr. Jackson introduced it to them, they would 
have told him, we already got this.  That’s why they laid it out…. We’re working on it. 
 
#8-  And then said, Wow… yours is almost exactly like ours. 
 
#10-  I’m going to be honest with y’all.  A lot of this is over my head ya know?  It’s computer 
language when you get in there like that.  It’s too complicated for me. 
 
#15-  Oh, it is.  It is complex.  You know, I don’t understand everything… all the technical 
mumbo jumbo. 
 
#10-  To me, it just looks like if you had a patent, it would be on something that is physical, 
something you can see.  You know? 
 
#15-  Yeah, Not these days. 
 
76 




#8-  Well, and it’s like the attorneys said, Mr. Jackson sold the company for $100,000 or 
whatever it was.  But the Walmart man, remember the attorney said he opened up one little old 
store in Arkansas, and now his family is worth who knows what.  That’s what I wrote down 
there, the attorney kept saying he had to do this, he had to do this, he had to do this, in order to 
get his patent filed.  And that’s what I wrote on my pad there, that’s the American way, keep at 
it.  And that’s what he did.   
 
#21- See I wondered about that too.  If it was something that everyone needed, why was he not 
able to market it better?  Was it because of the lack of funds?  To get that person with expertise 
out there to help him to market what he has.  Cause some people are smart enough to invent 
something, it doesn’t mean they have the communication skills to be able to sell something to 
you. 
 
#8- Right, yes Ma’am. 
 
#21- And I’m thinking maybe he was just so brilliant that he didn’t know how to go about selling 
it to other people.  Or manage it.  But that doesn’t mean that he doesn’t know how to create it 
himself. 
 
#8- And that one attorney for Quintech kept saying that Mr. Jackson and Salco doesn’t have but 
22 employees and we’ve got 52,000 of them.  I don’t care. 
 
#15- He was trying to play the economy card.  So many unemployed, this and that. 
 
#10- Well, I’m outnumbered on supporting Quintech. 
 
#12- That’s okay, we’ll turn you! 
 
#21- It’s fine. You should have your opinion. 
 
#10- Well, y’all are smarter than I am. 
 
#12- No, no no. 
 
#10-  I think that there was some stuff maybe I missed. 
 
#25-  Everybody has their own opinion, and that’s okay. 
 
#23- Yeah, that’s okay. 
 
#15- I wasn’t, I’m not a hundred percent.  There was enough in each side where it was like… 
well… yeah, yeah maybe. 
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#21- Lawyers are good at doing that. 
 
#23- So let’s vote again?  All who agree that Quintech did infringe Salco’s patent?  Raise your 
hand if you agree?  (All except #10) 
 
#10-  I just don’t see where Salco has proved anything to be honest with you.  I just don’t see no 
proof there, just allegations from one side.  How do you prove something like that? 
 
#8- One way Quintech proved it they’re infringing, is they’re willing to pay Salco.  Just not a 
140 million, but they’re willing to pay them.  That’s one way of saying, oh okay, I get it.  I 
guess, but you’re only worth 4 million.  That is one way of saying I know I did it.  Cause if I 
didn’t do it, I’m not going to pay you.   
 
#10-  Yeah, you got a point there.  Okay, I’ll go with y’all. 
 
#23- Okay, now that we found that Salco infringed, we need to consider damages. (reads) What 
sum of money, if paid now in cash, do you find by a preponderance of the evidence should be 
awarded to Salco as reasonable royalty to compensate it for the infringement of Claim 6 of the 
‘948 patent? Basically, how much should- if we say that Quintech owes Salco money, how much 
should they pay is basically what we’re asking. 
 
#8-  I think that the 140 million Salco is asking for is a little deep personally. 
 
#1- Yeah, it’s a little deep. 
 
#12-  Yeah, it’s deep. 
 
#23- Right, but in comparison to the 4.2 billion dollars that Quintech made in revenue… 
 
#12- Right, but did we see anything definitely proving that?  I would have liked a chart.  I would 
have liked something specifically showing me that that’s what they got.  Don’t you agree? 
 
#15-  Oh, yes.  The attorney for Salco said that though. 
 
#23- It’s based on Quintech made this much revenue off of a product that used their patent, and 
then based on that. I would think okay, you owe a percentage of that.  And it just happened in 
this case to be 4.2 billion… 
 
#12-  Supposedly.  See, I don’t buy that.  So 140 million to me is absolutely out of the question. 
 
#21-  One reason I am leaning more toward on the high side is why didn’t Quintech buy the 
license?  Back to my point, buy the license, give them the lump sum, and we wouldn’t be here.  
Quintech has drug this out over years, and they continued to use that product over the years and 
haven’t pulled it from their shelves. 
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#8-  Until now. 
 
#12-  But see, I still feel a lot of these cases, they are really asking for an enormous amount 
hoping they’ll get it.  But even if they get the smaller amount, that’s a lot of money. 
 
#15-  To us. 
 
#8-  She [juror 21] just said something, it never crossed my mind either.  Quintech knew that 
they have been using that patent, this has been going on for seven years now, and they never 
bothered, they just kept on making their money, so now… I’m like wow. 
 
#21-  When this started, why didn’t Quintech just start talking with Salco and say let’s start 
talking dollar amounts. 
 
#15-  Yeah, why didn’t they say let’s settle this?  Let’s get it taken care of. 
 
#23-  Why didn’t Quintech do a release without that patented technology in their product? 
 
#1-But a 140 million, I feel like is too much.  I feel like Quintech proved that had they been 
buying the patent license back at the time, it would have been a lower lump sum. So, I feel like 
140 million is too much, but I feel like it is worth a little more than the four million Quintech 
says, just based on the fact that they drug this out for so long. 
 
#8- So somewhere in the middle? 
 
#12-  I agree.   
 
#15- Yeah, somewhere in the middle. 
 
#12-  Yeah, good point. 
 
#25-  That’s what I was thinking too. 
 
#23-  Well there is 136-million-dollar difference between what the two attorneys said. 
 
#15-  Yeah, I was going to say like 40.  But you know… 
 
#1-I mean how many years has this been going on? 
 
#15-  Seven.   
 
#8-  I say 70 million. 
 
#25-  70 million, that’s what I thought.  I was like half the 140 million. 
 
#1- Yeah, somewhere in that area. 
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#23- Wait, I can’t do math.  72 if I do an exact half of the difference.  So 70 million is okay. 
 
#25-  Yeah, that’s right. 
 
#10- Okay, hang on--  Like I said, I was having a hard time understanding all of this 
technology and patent stuff, so I Googled Mr. Jackson and the patent.  Turns out that not 
only did Mr. Jackson never make or produce anything with his patent, but he has declared 
bankruptcy several times.  The articles I read said that he’s sued like five other big 
companies and made money off of them.  I think that’s just what he’s doing here.  He’s 
trying to make money off of something he wasn’t even smart enough to produce. According 
to the stuff I read online, he’s one of those patent trolls.  He makes his living off of suing 
people. 
 
#23-  I don’t think we’re supposed to consider information that wasn’t presented in court, 
and Mr. Jackson has the patents to back up why he’s suing people.  And he has spent 
money to produce… 
 
#8-  These Quintech people stole money from him. 
 
#10-  Y’all are probably right, but I ain’t seeing it the same way. 
 
#25- Well we can talk about it more. 
 
#10- I mean, y’all are throwing these millions away like that are chump change.  This Quintech 
does run a good business.  They are making a profit, they are doing good.  I don’t know whether 
they stole from this guy or not.   
 
#12-  But there is proof that they are using that processor that they want to call ‘just a button’ but 
it is really not a button right?  It is a processor right? 
 
#15-  It’s a function inside a program. 
 
#25-  But you know at one point, the Quintech system didn’t even work without using the 
patented technology remember seeing that?  They couldn’t use one without the other. 
 
#15-  It’s like buying a 4x4 truck, you may not use the 4x4, but you’re going to pay for it.  If 
that’s the way the truck comes… 
 
#10-  Okay, I’m on board with y’all now for compensation for Mr. Jackson, but y’all are way 
over my head with this.  But I say 4 million that Quintech said that patent was worth.  
 
#8-  Even though using his product probably made Quintech over a billion bucks we’re going to 
give them 4 million?   
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#1- One thing to consider, is that four million sounds like a lot to us, but whenever Mr. Jackson 
brought his patent idea to Quintech, they then went out and spent hundreds of millions of dollars 
to find the same thing that Mr. Jackson basically brought to them initially.  If Quintech had just 
bought the licensing in the first place, they would have spent at least that much to begin with. 
 
#8-  They’re still getting out cheap. 
 
#23-  So Salco is asking for 140, and the middle between 4 and 140 was 72.   
 
#25-  He got that patent. 
 
#8-  That’s my point, Quintech was trying to bash Mr. Jackson because he couldn’t get it done 
right away, but he kept going back to the drawing board, and like the great Americans we are, he 
made it work.  They owe him money. 
 
#25-  He proved that he did the patent, he got proof of that. 
 
#1- I think it’s more of the amount really.  We all agree that he deserves compensation, it is the 
amount and I think it is hard for us, I lived on a farm, a million dollars, $200, is a lot for me, I 
could do a lot with $200 free dollars… 
 
#10-  Mr. Jackson ain’t going to get all that money. 
 
#12-  Even more reason to get him that much. 
 
#1- True, the fact that they are forcing him to go through all of the lawyer stuff and drug this out 
over the years. 
 
#8-  After what she just said, I want to add about 10 more million. 
 
#23- Now, all in favor or 72 million?  And we’re still waiting on an answer.  What do you have? 
 
#10-  Four million. 
 
#25-  No, that’s too low. 
 
#1- If I had done it and they wanted to give me four million after seven years of using my 
product, I would want a lot more than four million. 
 
#15-  4.2 billion in revenue…  
 
#10- Okay, fine.  I’ll do 55 million, just not a full 72.  That’s too high. 
 
#8- That’s fine.  That’s a lot of money they wouldn’t have otherwise. 
 
General nodding of heads and agreement. 
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#23- That works for me.  All agreed? 
 
 (All jurors raise their hands)  
 
